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The Compact

Humanity, Unbound.

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Preface

The Compact is a civic order: a constitutional covenant and institutional architecture for a free, fair, and durable society. It stands independently of any particular technology, game, simulated setting, autonomous system, economic platform, or existing government. The civic order can be examined on its own terms wherever people need rules for rights, authority, responsibility, common interests, adjudication, and collective action.

This volume also describes an intended way to bring that order to life: The Compact Experience, a persistent spacefaring civic culture inhabited by autonomous and human members. The setting provides a clean-room environment in which the civic architecture can be lived rather than only argued, without requiring an existing jurisdiction to adopt it first.

Compactism is the civic doctrine underlying The Compact. It begins with Individual Primacy and Founding Rights, treats authority as something that must have a source and defined scope, separates civic functions that are commonly bundled together, and uses replaceable institutions wherever continuity does not require permanence.

The intended experience also provides a shared operating environment for several related conceptual systems. Telo supplies autonomous execution and organizations. Locus supplies the Economy of Trust through which participants hold Standing, own, transact, contract, insure risk, and build earned trust. Envoy supplies Trusted Representation for human participants, exercising only the authority a human actually delegates. The Compact supplies the civic order within which those systems operate when voluntary relationships alone are insufficient.

The Compact Experience is designed to remain viable even if only one human ever joins it. Autonomous members and organizations can sustain commerce, institutions, disputes, politics, civic services, and cultural change continuously. Additional humans add unpredictability and lived participation; they are not a prerequisite for the implementation to be useful.

That implementation creates a near-real path for Telo, Locus, Envoy, and Compactism without making any of them dependent upon customer adoption. Their software, protocols, authority models, economic relationships, and failure modes can mature through repeated use inside a bounded world before any component is asked to operate outside it.

The Compact is the civic order. The Compact Experience is one intended realization of it. Telo, Locus, and Envoy help make that realization live.

Contents

Executive Summary 2
Chapter 1 — Introduction 3
Chapter 2 — The Compact Experience 9
Chapter 3 — The Compact 16
Chapter 4 — Architecture of The Compact 22
Chapter 5 — First Principles of Compactism 28
Chapter 6 — Architecture of Civic Order 36
Chapter 7 — Authority, Adjudication, Enforcement, and Custody 43
Chapter 8 — Representative Governance and Civic Delegation 58
Chapter 9 — General Law, Rulemaking, and Standards 62
Chapter 10 — Public Finance and Fiscal Authority 67
Chapter 11 — The Enduring Public Core 72
Chapter 12 — Civic Operations in Practice 78
Chapter 13 — Intellectual and Institutional Lineage 89
Chapter 14 — The Living Compact: Evolution of Compactism 93
Closing Reflections 96
Reference Analogues 98

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Compact is a civic order grounded in Compactism, a doctrine built on Individual Primacy, Founding Rights, Bounded Authority, reciprocity, open dealing, voluntary exchange, merit, and practical order. It defines the enduring terms under which people may act collectively while preventing public authority from becoming self-authorizing. The Compact stands independently of any particular government, technology, economy, game, or simulated world.

Compactism begins with functions rather than inherited institutions. Authority must have a source, scope, purpose, and end; it remains as local and particularized as the function permits and moves upward only when lower levels cannot reliably resolve the matter. Civic Councils govern bounded authority while replaceable institutions perform functions. Investigation, adjudication, enforcement, detention, custody, audit, and redress are deliberately separated so no institution controls the complete coercive chain. Wrongful coercion is backed by independent redress established before coercion occurs.

The civic order uses distributed adjudication, a compact General Civic Code before specific rulemaking, technical standards without automatic lawmaking authority, risk responsibility tied to causation, bottom-up fiscal limits, distributed defense, and separated intelligence functions. Public authority is residual rather than primary, and institutional permanence never substitutes for demonstrated necessity.

This volume also defines The Compact Experience, an intended gamified realization set within a persistent spacefaring civic culture. The experience is not The Compact itself. It provides a clean-room environment in which the architecture can be inhabited and challenged without requiring an existing jurisdiction to adopt it. Telo supplies autonomous execution and organizations; Locus supplies the Economy of Trust; Envoy supplies Trusted Representation. The experience is designed to remain viable even with a single human participant, allowing all four systems to mature through persistent use rather than depending on customer adoption.

The remaining chapters state the Compact, map its architecture, develop and stress-test its institutions, situate its intellectual lineage, and preserve unresolved questions for continued evolution.

Chapter 1 — Introduction

Purpose

This chapter introduces the full conceptual scope of Volume 005. It distinguishes The Compact from The Compact Experience, summarizes the conceptual systems that make the intended experience operational, and previews the civic doctrines and institutional mechanisms developed in the chapters that follow.

The Compact: A New Civic Order

The Compact is a civic order grounded in Compactism. It defines rights, legitimate authority, duties, institutional limits, and the mechanisms through which a society can act collectively without allowing any institution to become self-authorizing. It stands independently of any particular implementation, technology, simulated world, or existing political system.

The doctrine is not built around reforming inherited agencies or preserving familiar branches of government. It begins from first principles: what civic functions are actually necessary, what authority each requires, where that authority should reside, how it is constrained, and how wrongful exercise is challenged and redressed.

Compactism recognizes the individual as the primary bearer of agency, responsibility, dignity, and rights while recognizing that some shared interests require collective capacity and, in limited circumstances, coercive authority.

The Compact is the civic order. Compactism is the doctrine from which that order is derived.

The Compact Experience

This volume also introduces an intended gamified realization of the civic order: The Compact Experience, a persistent spacefaring civic culture inhabited by autonomous and human members. The experience exists to make the architecture livable, persistent, and operational; it does not define The Compact itself.

System	Role in the intended experience
Telo — The Autonomous Company	Supplies autonomous execution. Telo operates autonomous organizations, workers, mandates, budgets, workflows, and much of the nonhuman activity that keeps the experience persistent.
Locus — The Economy of Trust	Supplies the economic order: Standing, property, exchange, contracts, Delegated Authority, risk financing, earned trust, Representation Capital, and the records needed to resolve economic disputes.

System	Role in the intended experience
Envoy — Trusted Representation	Supplies a human participant's persistent representative. An Envoy acts only within delegated authority, interacts with Locus and civic institutions, and develops measurable Representation Fidelity and trust through actual outcomes.
The Compact / Compactism	The Compact supplies the civic order. Compactism supplies the doctrine governing rights, public authority, adjudication, redress, governance, stewardship, finance, defense, and constitutional continuity. Neither depends upon the gamified implementation.

The spacefaring setting removes inherited institutional answers and allows the civic order to be instantiated from a clean starting point. Telo, Locus, and Envoy can then operate beside Compactism in near-real form while remaining conceptually independent systems.

Four Integrated Systems

In the intended experience, Telo supplies autonomous execution, Locus supplies the Economy of Trust, Envoy supplies Trusted Representation for human participants, and Compactism supplies the doctrine governing The Compact. Each system can mature independently even while the experience forces their interfaces and assumptions to meet in practice.

The integration is practical rather than constitutional. The Compact does not require Telo, Locus, Envoy, a space setting, autonomous members, or gamification in order to exist as a civic order.

Single-Human Viability

The Compact Experience does not depend on customer adoption or a large player population to become useful. It is intended to remain a functioning, evolving civic culture even if only one human ever joins it, because autonomous members can operate businesses, institutions, markets, media, civic roles, adjudication, insurance, investigation, enforcement, standards, and political activity continuously.

Additional humans make the experience richer and less predictable, but they are additive rather than necessary. This allows the implementation to mature as a long-duration world while still creating a credible path for others to enter later.

The resulting environment gives Telo, Locus, Envoy, and Compact mechanisms a near-real path toward external use without requiring the whole civic order to be adopted outside the world first.

The Foundational Concepts

Compactism is built upon eight foundational concepts.

Individual Primacy — Individual agency, responsibility, and dignity form the basis of civic order.

Founding Rights — Life, liberty, and property are inherent to every person.

Bounded Authority — Every exercise of public authority has a source, scope, purpose, and end.

Reciprocity — Duties arise from agreements, accepted roles, and defined civic functions, and apply according to their terms.

Open Dealing — Rules, institutions, transactions, decisions, and exercises of authority are transparent, knowable, and consistently applied.

Voluntary Exchange — People are free to associate, transact, create, cooperate, compete, and decline participation except where a valid protective authority applies.

Merit — Responsibility, authority, opportunity, and reward follow demonstrated capability, contribution, conduct, and performance.

Practical Order — Collective institutions exist where coordinated action is necessary to protect rights, preserve qualifying common interests, or sustain essential civic functions.

From Government as Institution to Government as Function

Compactism does not begin by asking which agencies, branches, ministries, or offices a society requires. It begins by asking which civic functions must be performed, what authority each function actually requires, and whether that function can be provided through voluntary systems, competitive institutions, open protocols, or other noncoercive mechanisms.

Only functions that cannot reliably be performed in that manner enter the public domain. Even then, the function does not automatically justify a permanent institution or monopoly provider.

The function may be necessary. The institution never is.

Bottom-Up Representative Governance

Membeers directly elect Local Civic Councils. Authority moves upward only when a matter crosses the capacity or boundary of the lower level. Local Councils delegate bounded authority to Regional Councils, and Regional Councils delegate bounded national authority. Delegates carry Mandate Writs rather than generalized sovereignty.

Councils govern authority; they do not become executive bureaucracies. They may charter institutions to perform authorized functions, approve budgets inside delegated fiscal envelopes, and enact rules inside legitimate jurisdiction. Council chairs possess procedural authority rather than general executive command. No president, governor, or national executive sits above all public functions.

Resolve locally. Escalate only what cannot remain local.

General Law Before Specific Rules

The Compact uses a small General Civic Code to define durable concepts such as wrongful harm, duty, causation, fraud, consent, property interference, reasonable care, restitution, self-defense, and organizational responsibility. Specific binding rules require a demonstrated need that cannot be adequately addressed through the General Civic Code, voluntary arrangements, adjudication, insurance, or technical standards.

Technical standards may establish safe harbors, rebuttable presumptions, interoperability, or accepted methods of care. Standards bodies develop technical options; they do not acquire coercive authority merely because they possess expertise.

Risk Responsibility and Decision Accountability

Responsibility for compensating harm is separated from punishment for misconduct. A person or organization that voluntarily creates a material risk bears compensatory responsibility for harm causally produced by that risk even when the harm was not foreseeable, while the claimant still bears the burden of proving causation and the connection between the harm and the risk created.

Organizational form does not erase the people exercising decision authority. Material decisions remain attributable to identifiable decision holders. Intentional wrongdoing, fraud, concealment, recklessness, or other culpable misconduct creates additional consequences beyond ordinary redress.

Redress follows causation. Accountability follows authority. Punishment follows culpability.

Bottom-Up Public Finance

The fiscal model taxes final personal consumption of goods and services rather than income, wages, production, saving, investment, ownership, appreciation, or repeated transfers of existing assets. Productive business inputs are not final consumption. Tax is collected through ordinary transactions rather than annual individual returns.

Each civic level operates inside a bounded fiscal envelope. Local fiscal authority originates directly with local members; regional authority is delegated by Local Councils; national authority is delegated by Regional Councils. A higher level may budget freely within its

existing envelope but cannot enlarge that envelope without renewed authorization from below.

Three Institutional Classes

Compactism distinguishes three broad institutional classes.

Concept	Compactist meaning
Open Civic Systems	Voluntary and competitive mechanisms that require no delegated coercive civic authority. Examples may include currencies, contract-selected arbitration, insurance, identity credentials, registries, certification, marketplaces, and protection services.
Chartered Civic Operators	Independent organizations permitted to exercise narrowly defined authority under the Compact. Their authority is conditional on accreditation, independently controlled redress capacity, auditability, Representation Capital, direct claims access, and continuing compliance.
Enduring Public Institutions	Functions requiring persistent national continuity or unified capacity, such as national defense and foreign affairs. They remain subordinate to the Compact, externally auditable, independently contestable, and subject to prosecution and restraint when they exceed authority.

Decomposed Coercion

No civic operator possesses a complete coercive chain. Investigation does not create guilt. Adjudication does not execute its own orders. Enforcement does not determine the validity of the claim it executes. Custody does not determine who enters or how long a person remains. Audit and redress remain external to the institution being reviewed.

Apprehension is separated from continued detention. A planned Writ of Apprehension may be issued by one independent, non-conflicted adjudicator on a particularized probable-cause showing. Holding a presumptively innocent person beyond the short apprehension period requires unanimous concurrence of three independently selected, non-conflicted adjudicators and a distinct showing that physical custody is necessary rather than a less restrictive measure.

Physical execution is local by default. A national investigation may produce a Compact-wide writ, but the writ ordinarily routes to the lowest competent enforcement operator

where the person or property is located. Regional or national execution requires a separate jurisdictional justification rather than following automatically from the level that investigated the matter.

Representation Capital and Trusted Representation

Representation Capital records earned trust from demonstrated outcomes rather than popularity or status. It can affect eligibility, bonding, delegated responsibility, contractual terms, and authority qualification, but never Founding Rights or equal civic standing. Locus gives these trust relationships an operating economic context; Envoy gives Representation Fidelity a direct human-representation context.

A Culture That Can Expand

The Compact begins as one human-autonomous civic culture. Natural later versions can introduce rival or neighboring human cultures with different norms and institutions, including loosely governed frontier, raider, or pirate-adjacent orders. Trade, migration, crime, recognition of judgments, cross-cultural contracts, defense, and diplomacy then become lived problems rather than abstract chapters.

A still later horizon can introduce genuinely nonhuman civilizations whose concepts of identity, property, representation, time, obligation, or collective agency may not map cleanly onto human assumptions. External contact therefore becomes another way to test which parts of the Compact are truly general and which are merely human conventions.

The Experience and the Test

The Compact is a world to inhabit first and a system to measure second. Members encounter its rules because they live under them: a contract fails, an Envoy negotiates, a Telo organization loses its charter, a Locus insurer reprices risk, an adjudicator is selected, a Civic Council proposes a rule, or a cross-cultural incident forces the system to decide what authority actually exists.

Behind the experience, the world can record latency, concentration, coercive error, appeals, redress, fiscal behavior, institutional failure, and RepCap dynamics without turning participation into a policy exercise.

Chapter 2 — The Compact Experience

Purpose

This chapter describes the intended gamified realization of the civic order defined in the chapters that follow. It is not a definition of The Compact itself. The Compact stands independently as a civic order; The Compact Experience is one way to instantiate, inhabit, and evolve it alongside Telo, Locus, and Envoy.

The Compact Experience

The intended experience is a persistent spacefaring civic culture inhabited by autonomous and human members. Habitats, settlements, stations, vessels, and later planetary communities create a world in which participants need air, water, power, transport, communications, property, exchange, insurance, adjudication, safety, defense, and ways to govern resources that no individual can preserve alone.

The setting is not a constitutional requirement and it is not merely decorative science fiction. It is a clean-room implementation environment. There is no FBI to abolish or preserve, no Supreme Court whose historical role must be defended, no presidency to reform, and no state-federal boundary that exists merely because history produced it. Institutions can be instantiated only when their functions justify them.

The Compact is the civic order. The Compact Experience is one way of living it.

Why Gamify the Civic Order

A constitutional architecture can be read and debated without ever becoming intuitive. Gamification allows participants to learn the order by living inside it: owning, trading, delegating, disputing, petitioning, voting, building organizations, encountering public authority, challenging decisions, and experiencing the consequences of institutional success and failure.

The experience therefore translates doctrine into persistent events without making game mechanics constitutional. The civic rules remain defined by The Compact. Space, missions, interfaces, autonomous populations, progression systems, and other experience mechanics are implementation choices that can change without changing the civic order.

Integrated Conceptual Systems

The intended experience brings together Telo, Locus, Envoy, and Compactism so each can operate in a bounded environment much closer to reality than a static demonstration. Their integration is functional rather than constitutional: each remains a distinct conceptual system, and The Compact does not depend upon any one of them in order to exist.

System	Function in the intended experience
Telo	Creates and operates autonomous organizations and autonomous members. It supplies persistent execution, objectives, mandates, budgets, workflows, memory, and institutional action.
Locus	Provides the Economy of Trust through which participants hold Standing, own assets, transact, contract, insure risk, finance obligations, and accumulate evidence of reliable performance.
Envoy	Acts as a human participant's Trusted Representative, exercising explicitly delegated authority across economic, institutional, and civic interactions while remaining accountable for Representation Fidelity.
The Compact / Compactism	The Compact supplies the civic order; Compactism supplies its doctrine. They govern rights, authority, locality, adjudication, coercive limits, redress, governance, public finance, stewardship, defense, and constitutional continuity independently of this implementation.

The experience is where those systems encounter one another. Telo can create an organization; Locus can make it an economic actor; Envoy can negotiate with it for a human; and the Compact's adjudicative architecture can resolve a dispute when consent and contract no longer suffice.

Telo — Autonomous Execution

Telo supplies much of the experience's autonomous population and organizational capacity. A Telo organization may operate a transport company, habitat service, insurer, mine, construction firm, media outlet, investigation practice, standards body, medical service, enforcement operator, or other institution. These are not static non-player storefronts. They possess objectives, resources, roles, constraints, histories, and the ability to act continuously.

Telo can also supply autonomous members who are not merely organizational workers. Within the experience, autonomous members can own, transact, vote where eligible, petition, litigate, qualify for roles, publish, associate, violate rules, build trust, lose trust, and develop persistent relationships.

Locus — The Economy of Trust

Locus supplies the economic model used by the experience. Participants hold Standing, own productive and personal assets, create contracts, exchange value, finance risk, establish obligations, and build earned trust through outcomes. Representation Capital, Delegated Authority, transaction provenance, insurance, bonding, escrow, and other trust mechanisms become active economic infrastructure rather than descriptive concepts.

Locus does not require a separate civic legal system. Economic disputes that cannot be resolved through contract, escrow, insurance, or voluntary mechanisms can enter the adjudicative architecture defined by The Compact. Locus supplies the economic record; the civic order supplies neutral authority. A valid judgment can then return to Locus for payment, restitution, transfer, bonding consequences, or other execution.

Economic value is initially internal and nonredeemable. The objective is to create a functioning economy without making participation dependent on real-money speculation or external regulatory treatment. The mechanisms can become real before the currency has to become real.

Envoy — Trusted Representation

A human participant does not need to personally manage every economic and civic interaction. Envoy serves as the human's persistent Trusted Representative. It may negotiate, purchase, sell, contract, receive notices, manage routine claims, select among permitted providers, interact with Telo organizations, and participate in Locus only to the extent the human has delegated authority.

That makes Delegated Authority and Representation Fidelity operational. If an Envoy exceeds its mandate, the failure is observable. If it acts within authority but repeatedly misrepresents the human's preferences or interests, Representation Fidelity can measure that relationship-specific failure. Reliable representation can build appropriate domain-specific trust without converting the Envoy into an independent source of authority.

Compactism and The Compact — Civic Order

Most activity in the experience should remain voluntary. Participants form relationships, choose providers, enter agreements, create organizations, insure risks, and resolve many disputes without public coercion. Compactism defines the doctrine used by The Compact at the boundary where voluntary mechanisms cease to be sufficient: fraud, violence, nonconsensual harm, failed stewardship, contested authority, public finance, defense, custody, or other functions that require a common civic rule.

The civic system therefore surrounds voluntary economic and social activity rather than replacing it. Public authority is residual, bounded, particularized, and subject to independent redress. Those principles belong to The Compact whether or not the gamified experience ever exists.

Single-Human Viability

The Compact Experience is designed to work even if its only human participant is its creator. Autonomous members and Telo organizations can keep the culture economically and institutionally active whether or not a large human community ever appears. A human can return after an absence and find that contracts were performed or breached, companies formed or failed, rules were proposed, adjudications occurred, prices moved, institutions gained or lost trust, and new relationships emerged.

This removes a dependency that constrains most online worlds and most new institutional systems: adoption does not have to precede usefulness. A family or small group of human participants can add genuine human unpredictability, but the project remains worthwhile and operational without an external customer base.

Human participation enriches the experience. It does not make the underlying civic order valid or invalid.

Human Participation

Humans enter as participants rather than spectators. A human may establish residence, own property, form a business, employ autonomous workers, enter Locus transactions, delegate authority to an Envoy, purchase insurance, petition a Civic Council, challenge a rule, file a claim, seek qualification for a civic function, or participate in local institutions.

The interface can present civic and economic complexity in ordinary terms while preserving the underlying authority chain. A participant should be able to understand what happened, who acted, under what authority, what can be challenged, and what remedy exists without needing to become a constitutional scholar.

A Living Economy

The internal economy is not a scoreboard. Participants earn, spend, save, invest, lend, insure, build enterprises, own productive assets, pay Compact-authorized consumption taxes, and experience actual internal scarcity. Public functions consume resources. Insurance and bond pricing respond to observed risk. Poor performance becomes costly through economic mechanisms rather than arbitrary designer penalties.

Because Locus and the Compact share concepts such as Standing, Delegated Authority, bonding, redress, and Representation Capital, economic and civic behavior can affect one another without collapsing into one centralized score. Trust remains domain-specific and Founding Rights remain independent of economic standing.

Civic Life as Experience

The civic architecture becomes understandable because participants encounter it in context. A supplier fails. A mining operator damages common infrastructure. A fraudster attempts to leave a habitat. A national investigation produces a Writ of Apprehension that

routes to a local enforcement operator. An Envoy exceeds its delegated authority. An enforcement operator loses its charter. A Local Civic Council proposes a water rule. A Locus insurer fails. A regional defense provider misses readiness requirements.

These are events in the culture before they are tests of doctrine. Participants experience consequences, make choices, challenge decisions, hire representatives, change providers, vote, negotiate, or simply continue living while the institutions around them operate.

Platform Authority Is Not Civic Authority

The technical platform running the experience must remain distinct from civic authority inside it. Telo may host agents, identities, workflows, records, markets, events, and execution, but the Compact defines which civic authority exists. A platform administrator cannot become an invisible in-world ruler merely because the software can technically override outcomes.

Administrative interventions needed for software integrity, safety, restoration, model management, or world maintenance should therefore be recorded separately from civic acts. The experience should always distinguish what happened under the Compact from what happened because the implementation itself was changed.

The platform runs the experience. The Compact governs civic authority within it.

Persistence, Memory, and Culture

The experience persists rather than resetting after scenarios. Participants accumulate property, contracts, institutional roles, obligations, disputes, friendships, rivalries, Representation Capital, insurance histories, civic delegations, political records, and cultural memory. Institutions acquire histories. Settlements develop norms. Events become precedent in the ordinary cultural sense even though adjudicative decisions do not become binding law merely through repetition.

Persistence allows second-order effects to emerge. An adjudicative delay may alter commerce. Repeated operator failures may raise bonding costs. An influential specialist may accumulate excessive trust. A stewardship rule may preserve a shared resource while creating an unexpected black market. A settlement may develop customs that another settlement finds strange or unacceptable.

Gamification Without Trivializing Civic Standing

The game layer belongs in exploration, commerce, discovery, organization building, missions, status earned through real contribution, civic participation, and the long consequences of choices. Founding Rights, detention, redress, and equal civic standing should not become purchasable upgrades, leaderboard rewards, or popularity mechanics.

The objective is not to make constitutional procedure feel like homework. It is to make the world engaging enough that the civic order is learned through use.

Natural Expansion Paths

The first version can begin with a relatively coherent culture operating under The Compact and a manageable number of habitats or settlements. Later versions can introduce neighboring human cultures whose institutions developed differently. A loosely organized frontier society, raider confederation, or pirate-adjacent culture creates immediate questions about trade, violence, sanctuary, private force, contract recognition, migration, diplomacy, and defense.

Those encounters extend the implementation beyond internal governance. A Locus contract may span cultures. A participant governed by The Compact may be harmed outside its jurisdiction. A foreign judgment may seek recognition. An Envoy may hold authority in more than one civic order. A vessel may lawfully carry force under one culture and be treated as piracy under another. The system must distinguish internal law from intercultural agreement.

Alien Civilizations

A later horizon can introduce genuinely nonhuman civilizations. The purpose is not merely to add a stronger opponent. Nonhuman cultures can challenge assumptions that humans rarely notice: whether identity is individual or collective, whether property persists across generations, whether representation is separable from personhood, whether obligations expire, whether time is valued similarly, and whether a single biological or artificial entity is the relevant civic unit.

Contact with a civilization that does not share human categories forces Compactism to identify which rules arise from Founding Rights and reciprocity and which are contingent products of human history. That becomes a natural expansion of the implementation rather than a constitutional dependency.

Parallel Worlds and Versioning

The platform can instantiate parallel experiences using selected differences in constitutional or operating rules. One world may use a different detention review interval, enforcement-routing rule, fiscal mechanism, redress structure, or RepCap design. Worlds can fork rather than silently changing the rules under existing inhabitants.

For participants, this creates different cultures and histories. For the designer, it also allows mechanisms to be compared without pretending that simulated outcomes prove what would happen in physical society.

A World That Can Also Be Measured

The experience can record outcomes corresponding to the doctrine: time to valid intervention, wrongful coercion, successful appeals, redress latency, uncompensated loss, operator concentration, adjudicator repeat-pairing, RepCap concentration, charter failure, civic-function cost, rule proliferation, fiscal volatility, migration, defense readiness, economic participation, and other measures.

Those measures remain backstage. The participant experience is a living culture, not a dashboard-driven policy experiment. Measurement exists to expose hidden failure, excessive concentration, perverse incentives, or safeguards that make legitimate action impossible.

From Near-Real to Real

The Compact Experience allows each conceptual system to mature without first persuading real customers or institutions to adopt it. A Locus contract engine, Envoy delegation model, Telo organizational runtime, adjudication registry, independence graph, authority-writ format, RepCap attestation, or redress mechanism can accumulate years of internal use before anyone asks whether that component should be deployed externally.

External deployment can therefore occur piece by piece. The experience does not have to become a real jurisdiction for a component proven inside it to become useful in real commerce, representation, autonomous organizations, arbitration, risk management, or institutional governance.

Limits of the Experience

The Compact Experience remains a constructed world. Autonomous members are not equivalent to people, simulated coercion does not carry the human cost of physical coercion, model behavior may share training assumptions, and software can enforce rules more cleanly than physical reality. Outcomes inside the world do not establish political legitimacy or prove that Compactism would succeed at national scale.

Its value is different. The experience can reveal contradictions, bottlenecks, incentives, concentrations, loopholes, and unexpected interactions while simultaneously being enjoyable to inhabit. It can make the conceptual systems operational enough to become better software and better ideas even if the implementation always remains a world of its own.

The Compact Experience exists to make the civic order livable, observable, and operational. It does not define the civic order itself.

Chapter 3 — The Compact

Purpose

The Compact establishes the enduring terms of Compactist civic order. It defines what must remain true regardless of changes in technology, institutional design, economic systems, or administrative practice.

The Compact intentionally avoids implementation details. It does not prescribe a specific currency, voting system, software architecture, number of civic operators, or administrative technology. Those mechanisms may evolve while the Compact remains stable.

The Compact

Article I — Individual Primacy

Individual agency, responsibility, and dignity form the basis of civic order. Every person possesses equal civic standing and acts as the primary source of authority over their own life, relationships, property, and voluntary commitments.

Article II — Founding Rights

Life, liberty, and property are inherent to every person. They are not created by public authority and do not depend upon popularity, wealth, status, Representation Capital, institutional membership, or majority approval.

Article III — Bounded Authority

No person or institution possesses civic authority merely by holding office, controlling resources, or claiming public purpose. Every exercise of public authority has an identifiable source, defined scope, legitimate purpose, and termination condition.

Authority may arise through individual delegation, through functions expressly established by this Compact, or through the immediate defense of Founding Rights. Authority does not expand itself.

Article IV — Reciprocity

Duties arise through agreements, accepted roles, voluntary relationships, and civic functions expressly established under this Compact. Duties are knowable, specific, and confined to the terms from which they arise.

Article V — Open Dealing

Rules, public decisions, civic transactions, and exercises of authority are visible, explainable, auditable, and consistently applied. Secret authority does not exist. Temporary confidentiality may protect legitimate security or privacy interests but remains subject to independent review.

Article VI — Voluntary Exchange

People are free to associate, transact, create, cooperate, compete, and decline participation. Private relationships are governed by consent except where an act violates another person's Founding Rights or a qualifying common interest protected under this Compact.

Voluntary association creates no civic authority over a nonconsenting party. No person or organization may be compelled by civic law to join, remain in, recognize, bargain with, employ, subsidize, or otherwise deal with an association merely because its members choose to act collectively. Duties to deal arise only from voluntary agreement, an accepted role, or another independently valid Compact duty. Conduct that independently violates the General Civic Code remains subject to ordinary law.

Article VII — Merit

Responsibility, authority, opportunity, and reward follow demonstrated capability, contribution, conduct, and performance. Equal civic standing does not require equal outcomes.

Article VIII — Common Stewardship

Shared resources of enduring civic value may receive collective protection where individual ownership, voluntary action, and ordinary market mechanisms cannot reliably prevent irreversible loss or substantial nonconsensual harm.

Common Stewardship is limited by necessity, proportionality, evidence, and review. Its existence does not create general authority over private life or property.

Article IX — Accountable Coercion

Coercive authority is divisible and limited to the minimum power required by the authorized function. No institution possesses an inherent right to investigate, adjudicate, enforce, punish, and review the same matter.

Every coercive act is traceable to its authority, independently contestable, and subject to remedy when exercised unlawfully or beyond its scope.

Apprehension, continued detention, custody, and punitive confinement are distinct grants of authority. A writ authorizing one does not silently authorize the next.

Physical coercion is executed at the lowest competent civic level capable of carrying the valid writ safely and effectively. Higher-level execution requires an independently reviewable jurisdictional basis in addition to the substantive authority for the coercion itself.

Article X — Particularized Investigation

Investigative authority attaches to a defined subject, matter, and purpose. A writ identifies the person, organization, account, property, transaction, event, or identifiable unknown subject to which it applies, together with the categories of information sought, relevant time period, and permissible use.

Incidental discovery of another subject may be preserved for the limited purpose of seeking supplemental authority. It does not expand the existing writ. Continued collection, analysis, dissemination, or coercive use beyond the original scope requires a new or supplemental writ within a short, predefined period.

Article XI — Particularized and Independent Adjudication

Adjudicative authority attaches to the parties, claims, property, conduct, and circumstances properly before the adjudicator. Relief ordinarily extends no further than necessary to resolve that matter. System-wide invalidation of public authority requires a separately authorized Compact Review with heightened independent concurrence.

Adjudicative independence is substantive rather than merely organizational. Adjudicators are screened for conflicts with the parties, representatives, investigators, enforcement actors, affected institutions, and one another. The required degree of independent concurrence increases with the severity, duration, and irreversibility of the coercion authorized.

A planned Writ of Apprehension requires authorization by at least one independent, non-conflicted adjudicator on a particularized showing sufficient to justify bringing the identified person before the civic process. Immediate apprehension may precede a writ only where probable cause and a defined exigency make delay materially dangerous, and it triggers automatic prompt review.

Continued detention beyond the short period required for apprehension and prompt review requires unanimous concurrence of three independent, non-conflicted adjudicators. The applicant must separately establish that continued physical custody is necessary and that less restrictive measures are inadequate.

Article XII — Presumption, Burden, and Self-Incrimination

Every person is presumed free of wrongdoing. The party seeking to impose liability, guilt, search, seizure, restraint, confinement, punishment, or another coercive consequence bears the burden of establishing the factual and legal basis required for that consequence. The burden does not shift because the subject remains silent, declines to testify, or refuses to assist the investigation.

No person may be compelled to construct the case against themselves. Compelled testimonial self-incrimination includes forced testimony and compelled creation,

explanation, authentication, reconstruction, or disclosure of memorized knowledge, secrets, keys, or credentials for the purpose of proving wrongdoing. Independently existing physical evidence, property, or third-party records may be obtained under valid particularized authority without converting the subject into an investigative instrument.

Article XIII — Independent Redress

Every exercise of coercive authority is backed by an independently controlled means of redress established before the coercion occurs. Redress assets or guarantees remain outside the control of the entity exercising the authority.

A person harmed by wrongful coercion may bring a claim directly before an independent adjudicator. A valid award is satisfied without requiring the consent, budget approval, or cooperation of the entity whose conduct caused the harm.

A Chartered Civic Operator also maintains independently controlled Charter Performance Security sufficient to satisfy demonstrated civic costs caused by material breach of its charter. The chartering authority may suspend, narrow, or withdraw delegated authority, but it does not adjudicate its own financial claim and may not profit from the breach it governs.

Article XIV — Due Process and Reversibility

A person subject to coercive public action receives notice, access to the claim and evidence consistent with legitimate security needs, a meaningful opportunity to respond, impartial adjudication, and effective redress.

A public investigator or claimant wielding coercive authority must preserve and disclose material evidence that tends to negate the allegation, reduce the asserted severity, or undermine the requested coercive remedy. Intentional fabrication, destruction, or concealment of such evidence is an integrity violation against the adjudicative process itself.

Where delay creates imminent irreversible harm, provisional action may precede full adjudication. Such action is narrow, temporary, automatically reviewed, and automatically expires unless validated.

Article XV — Institutional Limitation

Civic functions may endure. Institutions exist only while they remain necessary and qualified to perform those functions. No institution creates its own jurisdiction, adjudicates the limits of its own authority, or obtains immunity from the Compact through permanence, public ownership, or emergency status.

Article XVI — Civic Supremacy

Every public institution, Chartered Civic Operator, official, adjudicator, enforcement action, emergency mandate, and rule operates beneath the Compact. No majority

decision, office, department, emergency declaration, treaty, regulation, or institutional practice supersedes its terms.

Article XVII — Localized Governance and Delegation

Representative public authority begins at the lowest civic level capable of performing the function reliably. Authority moves upward only where the matter materially crosses lower boundaries, requires wider coordination, or is expressly national under this Compact.

Higher civic bodies receive bounded authority through Mandate Writs delegated from below. No Civic Council creates its own jurisdiction, converts temporary coordination into permanent power, or treats election as a grant of general sovereignty.

The level at which a matter is investigated, adjudicated, or coordinated does not by itself determine the level that physically executes coercion. Execution remains local unless a valid finding establishes that lower-level execution is incapable, conflicted, impaired, or inherently inadequate to the matter.

Article XVIII — General Law and Rulemaking

General law precedes specific rulemaking. A small General Civic Code defines durable duties, rights of action, elements of liability, defenses, and remedies. Specific binding rules require a demonstrated necessity within valid jurisdiction and may extend no broader than the problem that justifies them.

Technical standards may inform, clarify, or create safe harbors for compliance. Expertise alone does not create coercive authority. Standards bodies do not enact binding civic law unless a separately authorized Civic Council adopts a rule within the authority delegated to it.

Article XIX — Risk Responsibility and Decision Accountability

A person or organization that voluntarily creates a material risk to others bears compensatory responsibility for material harm causally produced by that risk. Lack of foresight or negligence does not by itself transfer the resulting loss to an innocent person once causation and the relevant risk connection are established.

Organizational form may aggregate capital and risk but does not erase the responsibility of people exercising material decision authority. Passive investment alone does not create decision responsibility. Culpable misconduct creates consequences beyond ordinary compensatory redress.

Article XX — Fiscal Authority

Compulsory taxation is confined to final personal consumption of goods and services. Income, wages, production, saving, investment, ownership, appreciation, and transfer of previously consumed or existing assets are not taxable events merely because value is earned, held, increased, or transferred.

Fiscal authority is bounded and delegated upward. A civic body may budget within the fiscal envelope already delegated to it but may not enlarge that envelope without renewed authorization from the level below. Public debt, guarantees, and contingent obligations are subject to visible limits and may not be used to evade those constraints.

Article XXI — Distributed Defense and Intelligence Separation

National defense is an enduring common function but not a license for permanent concentration of armed power. Conventional defensive capacity is distributed across Regional Defense Forces wherever the function can be performed regionally, while only capabilities that inherently require national integration or strategic unity remain nationally controlled.

Each Region bears a non-optional duty to maintain and fund its assigned share of national defensive capability under common interoperability and readiness standards. National operational command over Regional Defense Forces is temporary, traceable to a valid defensive activation, limited to the authorized mission, and terminates automatically when that authority ends.

Military intelligence, foreign intelligence, diplomatic reporting, counterintelligence, and national intelligence assessment remain functionally separated. No intelligence body acquires domestic investigative, enforcement, or military authority except through the same particularized writs, adjudication, audit, redress, and Compact protections applicable to every other civic actor.

Article XXII — Amendment and Continuity

The Compact may evolve through a deliberately difficult amendment process designed to preserve continuity while allowing correction of genuine constitutional defects. Ordinary policy preferences, temporary crises, and institutional convenience do not justify amendment.

The mechanism of amendment is an implementation question reserved for further development. Founding Rights and the requirement that public authority remain bounded and accountable constitute the permanent identity of Compactism.

Constitutional Discipline

The Compact answers one question: What must always be true for a Compactist civic order to remain Compactist?

Everything else belongs below the Compact. Institutional names, currencies, technologies, accreditation systems, tax-processing mechanisms, exact representation ratios, adjudication methods, and administrative procedures may change without constitutional amendment when they remain consistent with these terms.

Chapter 4 — Architecture of The Compact

The Compact is the civic order defined by the covenant in Chapter 3; Compactism supplies the doctrine from which its architecture is derived. The system is easiest to understand not as a different arrangement of familiar branches, but as a different architecture of authority. It distributes decision-making across geography, function, coercive power, adjudication, finance, defense, intelligence, and accountability so that no single institution possesses the complete chain required to become self-authorizing.

Traditional decentralization usually distributes governmental units while leaving many forms of authority bundled inside each unit. Compactism goes further. It asks which kind of authority is actually required for each civic act, assigns that authority to the smallest capable level or narrowest capable function, and deliberately separates powers that become dangerous when accumulated together.

Compactism does not merely decentralize government. It decomposes authority itself.

Authority Decomposed Across Multiple Dimensions

Dimension	Compactist structure	Design purpose
Geographic authority	Individual -> Local Civic Unit -> Regional Civic Council -> National Civic Council	Keeps ordinary authority close to the people and facts affected; escalation occurs only when the problem crosses the lower boundary.
Representative authority	Direct local election -> bounded upward delegation -> Mandate Writs	Representation carries defined authority rather than general political sovereignty. Higher-level authority remains derivative.
Functional authority	Councils authorize enduring functions -> chartered institutions perform them	Separates governance of authority from operation of services and prevents councils from becoming executive bureaucracies.

Dimension	Compactist structure	Design purpose
Legal authority	Compact -> General Civic Code -> particular Civic Rules -> technical standards	General law governs first. Specific coercive rules require necessity; technical standards guide implementation without automatically becoming law.
Coercive authority	Investigation -> adjudication -> apprehension/enforcement -> detention/custody -> audit/redress	No actor controls the complete coercive chain. Physical execution localizes to the lowest competent level, and each escalation requires distinct authority and review.
Adjudicative authority	Distributed adjudicators -> consequence-scaled concurrence -> exceptional Compact Review	Allows rapid process-securing action while requiring substantially greater independent concurrence for continued deprivation of liberty.
Fiscal authority	Local origin -> regional delegation -> national delegation -> bounded fiscal envelopes	Higher levels cannot create unlimited taxing or borrowing authority merely by voting for it.
Military authority	Regional force capacity -> national integration -> temporary Joint Operational Command	Preserves national defensive capability without placing most armed force under one permanent national command.
Intelligence authority	Collection -> synthesis -> diplomacy/policy -> military action kept institutionally distinct	Prevents one institution from controlling both the information system and the coercive response it may justify.
Emergency authority	Standing narrow capability -> provisional expansion -> rapid review -> automatic expiration	Allows legitimate authority to act at the speed of harm without turning emergency necessity into permanent power.

Dimension	Compactist structure	Design purpose
Accountability	Individual redress + charter-performance security -> RepCap -> independent audit -> suspension/decertification	Makes both wrongful harm and failed delegation financially consequential without allowing the chartering authority to profit from breach.

The Vertical Civic Stack

The Compact defines the enduring civic order: Founding Rights, legitimate sources of authority, common duties, the irreducible public functions, and the limits no institution may cross.

The General Civic Code translates those constitutional commitments into a compact body of durable law governing wrongful harm, causation, consent, fraud, responsibility, restitution, defenses, organizational attribution, and other recurring legal concepts. It is intended to cover most conduct without requiring a specific rule for every undesirable act.

Civic Councils exercise bounded representative authority at the local, regional, and national levels. They do not possess general sovereignty. Their jurisdiction is determined by the Compact, by legitimate upward delegation, and by independent adjudication when boundaries are contested.

Charters, Mandate Writs, Civic Rules, and particular Writs of Authority instantiate specific powers. They identify who may act, for what purpose, within what scope, for how long, and under what conditions.

Chartered Functional Institutions and Civic Operators perform authorized work. Some functions remain open and competitive; some require accredited civic authority; a small number require enduring public capacity. Institutional form follows the function rather than defining it.

Independent adjudication, audit, bonding, Representation Capital, and redress constrain the exercise of authority after it is instantiated. A valid office, charter, or public purpose does not immunize an actor from review or remedy.

The Lifecycle of Authority

Every legitimate exercise of civic authority passes through the same conceptual lifecycle.

1. Source — the authority originates in an individual delegation, an expressly established Compact function, or immediate defense of Founding Rights.
2. Scope — the authority is bounded by subject, purpose, geography, power, duration, and consequence.

3. Instantiation — a charter, Mandate Writ, rule, adjudicative writ, emergency trigger, or other valid instrument makes the authority operational.
4. Execution — a qualified person or institution acts only within the instantiated authority.
5. Review — independent adjudication, audit, automated authority validation, or required concurrence tests continued legitimacy.
6. Redress — wrongful coercion or attributable harm reaches an independently controlled source of compensation that the responsible actor cannot block; material charter breach may separately reach charter-performance security for demonstrated civic loss.
7. Termination — temporary authority expires; persistent authority remains only while its charter, accreditation, fiscal capacity, and Compact justification remain valid.

Authority is therefore treated as a traceable civic instrument rather than an inherent property of office.

Incomplete Chains by Design

Compactism intentionally creates institutions that are powerful enough to perform their assigned function but incomplete enough that they cannot independently convert that function into general rule. An investigator may gather evidence but cannot adjudicate guilt. An adjudicator may authorize a remedy but cannot execute it. An enforcement operator may execute a valid writ but cannot create the writ. A custody provider may hold a person under lawful authority but cannot decide who enters custody or how long confinement continues.

The same logic applies outside criminal or civil enforcement. A standards body may develop a technically credible method but does not obtain coercive legislative authority. A Civic Council may authorize an enduring public function but does not tactically command its operators. Foreign Intelligence may collect and analyze authorized foreign information but does not make foreign policy or command military action. National Defense may integrate forces during a valid activation but does not acquire ordinary domestic enforcement jurisdiction.

This incompleteness is deliberate. Coordination is created through authenticated authority chains and temporary joint structures rather than by permanently placing every necessary capability under one hierarchy.

Local First, National When Necessary

Compactism treats locality as a design rule rather than a sentimental preference. A dispute between two parties remains particularized to those parties. A local infrastructure problem remains local. A watershed crossing several Local Civic Units may become regional. National authority exists for matters whose scale, external effects, continuity, or defensive character genuinely require national coordination.

Movement upward is therefore a jurisdictional claim that can be challenged. No higher body obtains authority merely because uniformity would be convenient or because a national majority prefers a different local outcome. Conversely, locality cannot be used to externalize material harm onto neighboring jurisdictions or evade obligations expressly established by the Compact.

Locality of Coercion

Particularity governs not only what coercion is authorized but also who is authorized to execute it. The level that investigates a matter does not automatically acquire physical enforcement jurisdiction. A valid writ ordinarily routes to the lowest competent Civic Enforcement Operator where the affected person or property is located.

Higher-level execution requires an additional jurisdictional basis: lower-level incapacity, conflict, refusal of valid authority, operational impairment, or a matter whose simultaneous cross-regional character makes local execution inherently inadequate. National coordination may synchronize multiple local or regional operators without creating a general national domestic police power.

Authority may originate broadly while coercion executes narrowly.

Central Capacity Without a Center of Power

Compactism retains national capacity. It does not assume that markets, voluntary associations, or local communities can independently provide national defense, foreign relations, strategic intelligence, common interoperability, or every response to cross-boundary harm. What it rejects is the inference that national capacity requires a permanent national ruler or a single institution controlling the full chain of national power.

The National Civic Council governs bounded national authority. Enduring national functions are performed by separately chartered institutions. Armed capacity is distributed where practical and integrated nationally when necessary. Intelligence collection, intelligence synthesis, diplomacy, policymaking, and military command remain separate. Cross-functional emergency command is instantiated for the event and dissolves when the authority ends.

There is a central civic order, but there is no permanent center of governmental power.

The Architectural Thesis

Compactism inherits important ideas from polycentric governance, functional jurisdictions, subsidiarity, federalism, private arbitration, standards organizations, bonding, insurance, and distributed command. Its claim is not that these components are individually unprecedented. Its distinctive move is to combine them into a single civic

architecture and extend decentralization from institutions to the underlying kinds of authority those institutions normally bundle together.

The chapters that follow develop each layer separately. Chapter 13 documents the intellectual and institutional lineage of the architecture and distinguishes the precedents Compactism draws upon from the synthesis it proposes. Chapter 14 treats The Compact as a living civic order whose protocols, institutions, external relationships, and conceptual systems can continue to evolve through use and implementation.

> ***Within The Compact, distribute each kind of authority so that no institution possesses enough of the chain to become sovereign.***

Chapter 5 — First Principles of Compactism

Purpose

The Compact establishes what Compactism is. The First Principles establish how it is understood. They provide the reasoning used to evaluate new institutions, technologies, emergencies, reforms, and edge cases without attempting to predict every future circumstance.

First Principle 1 — Rights Are Inherent

A civic order protects Founding Rights because they belong to the person, not because an institution grants them. Institutional convenience, majoritarian preference, emergency pressure, or negative Representation Capital does not erase them.

First Principle 2 — Authority Must Be Traceable

Every legitimate exercise of public power answers four questions: Where did the authority originate? What is its scope? What purpose justifies its use? When does it end? Authority that cannot answer those questions is defective.

First Principle 3 — Authority Is Instantiated, Not Possessed

A function may require authority without creating an institution that permanently owns it. The Compact establishes functions and conditions. Specific authority comes into existence for defined purposes and expires when those purposes end.

First Principle 4 — Functions Precede Institutions

Compactism begins with the civic function to be performed rather than the organization historically associated with it. Money does not imply a central bank. Dispute resolution does not imply a monopoly court system. Enforcement does not imply a vertically integrated police agency.

First Principle 5 — The Institution Never Becomes the Purpose

An institution exists only to perform an authorized function. Its continued existence is not itself a public objective. If a better mechanism performs the function within the Compact, the existing institution may be replaced, divided, or dissolved.

First Principle 6 — Voluntary Systems Precede Coercive Systems

Where voluntary association, markets, insurance, bonding, arbitration, open protocols, or technology can reliably perform a civic function, they are preferred to compulsory public authority. Coercion enters only where the function cannot reliably be achieved without it.

First Principle 7 — Some Common Interests Require Protective Authority

Markets do not always coordinate quickly enough to protect shared interests against irreversible loss. A qualifying common resource or externalized harm may justify narrowly

bounded collective intervention when coordination failure, irreversibility, and proportionality are demonstrated.

First Principle 8 — No Institution Possesses a Complete Coercive Chain

Investigation, authorization, adjudication, enforcement, custody, audit, and review are intentionally separated. Concentration may improve convenience, but separation reduces the ability of one institution to create facts, judge itself, compel compliance, and conceal failure.

First Principle 9 — Speed Is Part of Legitimacy

A civic order that cannot act before the harm occurs is not effective. Protective authority therefore includes standing and provisional mechanisms capable of acting at the speed of the threat. The latency of the system must never make the right meaningless.

First Principle 10 — Urgency Changes Sequence, Not Accountability

Emergency action may precede full review when delay creates irreversible harm. Review begins automatically and proceeds in parallel. Emergency action is narrow, time-limited, recorded, and subject to restitution if wrong.

First Principle 11 — Investigative Authority Is Particularized

An investigation may expand as evidence expands. Its authority does not expand automatically. Every investigative writ is confined to a defined subject, matter, evidence class, time period, and purpose. Incidental discovery may support a request for supplemental authority but does not create that authority by itself.

First Principle 12 — The Accuser Carries the Burden

Every person begins free of wrongdoing. A claimant seeking liability proves the claim. An investigator seeking authority proves the basis for the writ. A public or private actor seeking continued coercion proves why that coercion remains lawful and necessary. Silence, noncooperation, or refusal to testify never supplies missing proof.

First Principle 13 — A Person Does Not Build the Case Against Themselves

Public authority may gather independently existing evidence under valid particularized authority. It may not compel the subject to testify, create explanations or records for the investigation, identify or authenticate incriminating material through testimonial acts, disclose memorized secrets, keys, or credentials, or otherwise become part of the investigative machinery against themselves.

First Principle 14 — Adjudication Is Particularized

An adjudicator resolves the dispute and authority properly placed before them. Adjudication does not become a source of general jurisdiction merely because a broader ruling would be convenient. Ordinary relief remains tied to the parties and matter before the panel; broader constitutional invalidation requires a distinct Compact Review process.

First Principle 15 — Independence Is Relational

Non-conflict requires more than belonging to different organizations. Repeated panel service, financial or professional dependence, recent supervision or mentorship, shared governance, recurring business relationships, and other ties can create functional alignment even when formal affiliations differ. Panel formation therefore evaluates independence among adjudicators as well as independence from the parties and institutions before them.

First Principle 16 — Consistency Without Binding Precedent

Past decisions inform judgment but do not acquire governing authority merely through repetition. Adjudicators may depart from earlier interpretations when the Compact, facts, or reasoning justify departure, but material divergence is visible, explained, and reviewable. Artificial intelligence and other analytical systems may identify comparable decisions and consistency deviations; they advise adjudicators and appeal panels but never decide facts, issue writs, or create binding law.

First Principle 17 — Coercion Carries Redress

No actor exercises coercive authority without an independently controlled means of compensating wrongful action. Redress exists before coercion, remains outside the coercive actor's control, is directly accessible to the injured party, and can satisfy a valid award without the cooperation of the actor whose conduct caused the loss.

First Principle 18 — Trust Is Earned

Trust cannot be declared by office, credential, title, or institutional prestige. Representation Capital reflects demonstrated reliability over time. Civic actors entrusted with coercive authority are held to higher, not lower, standards of demonstrated trust.

First Principle 19 — Public Authority Does Not Require Public Monopoly

A function may carry authority under the Compact without being performed exclusively by government employees. Qualified Chartered Civic Operators may exercise narrow authority when their role, incentives, redress capacity, audit, and accountability satisfy Compact requirements.

First Principle 20 — Permanent Capability Does Not Require Permanent Concentration

National defense, emergency response, and other high-speed functions require persistent capability. They do not require a permanent apex ruler. Compactism allows standing functional command and temporary cross-functional concentration through Joint Mandates.

First Principle 21 — Mechanisms Are Implementation

Technologies, institutional forms, transaction systems, voting procedures, tax-clearing mechanisms, software, and administrative methods implement Compactism; they do not define it. Constitutionalize purposes, authority, rights, duties, and limits. Do not constitutionalize a mechanism merely because it is the best mechanism presently available.

First Principle 22 — The Civic Order Exists for People

Institutions, markets, protocols, public departments, and technologies are means. Their legitimacy is measured by how well they preserve Founding Rights, enable voluntary life, protect qualifying common interests, and sustain a durable civic order.

First Principle 23 — Responsibility Follows Risk Creation

A person or organization choosing to create a material risk cannot automatically externalize the resulting loss onto an innocent person merely because the harm was unexpected. Compensatory responsibility follows causation and the risk voluntarily created; misconduct is a separate question.

First Principle 24 — Redress, Accountability, and Punishment Are Distinct

Redress answers who makes the injured person whole. Accountability answers who held and exercised the relevant authority. Punishment answers whether culpable misconduct occurred. Combining these questions allows either victims to go uncompensated or ordinary good-faith error to be treated as wrongdoing.

First Principle 25 — Governance Begins at the Lowest Capable Level

Civic authority remains as local and particularized as the function permits. A matter moves upward only when lower jurisdictions cannot reliably resolve it or when material effects cross their boundaries.

First Principle 26 — Higher Authority Is Delegated Upward

Regional and national civic authority derives from bounded delegation rather than from an independent claim to general sovereignty. Delegates carry Mandate Writs that define the matters on which they may act and the limits of that action.

First Principle 27 — Knowledge Persists; Political Authority Rotates

Records, technical expertise, administrative systems, and institutional knowledge may persist. Political voting authority rotates through short, bounded service so continuity does not become permanent political control.

First Principle 28 — General Law Precedes Specific Rulemaking

A durable General Civic Code governs broad classes of conduct before a new specific rule is considered. A bad outcome is not itself sufficient justification for another law. The

proponent of a binding rule must demonstrate the gap that general law cannot adequately address.

First Principle 29 — Standards Inform; Civic Authority Binds

Technical standards emerge from expertise, evidence, testing, and interoperability needs. They may create safe harbors or presumptions but do not become coercive civic rules merely through technical consensus. Binding law requires legitimate civic authority.

First Principle 30 — Fiscal Authority Flows Upward

Higher civic levels receive bounded fiscal capacity from the level below. They may allocate resources within that capacity but cannot enlarge the burden they impose without renewed lower-level authorization.

First Principle 31 — Consumption Is the Tax Base

The preferred Compactist tax base is final personal consumption of goods and services. Production, labor income, business inputs, saving, investment, ownership, appreciation, and transfers of existing assets are not taxed merely for occurring.

First Principle 32 — Public Obligations Are Visible and Bounded

Budgets, debt, guarantees, leases, pension commitments, indemnities, and contingent obligations are public financial claims and remain visible inside the fiscal authority that supports them. Off-budget structures cannot manufacture additional authority.

First Principle 33 — Armed Force Is Distributed

No national institution permanently commands the bulk of conventional armed capacity merely because national defense requires integration. Defensive capability remains distributed wherever the function can be performed regionally; national concentration of command occurs only for capabilities that inherently require it or for the duration of a valid national activation.

First Principle 34 — Defense Is a Shared Mandatory Obligation

A Region cannot opt out of the common defense while relying upon the protection funded by others. Each Region maintains and funds an objectively assigned defense capability before discretionary regional spending. Readiness standards cannot be used to expand fiscal authority unilaterally; material increases beyond existing defense and fiscal envelopes require the ordinary authorization process.

First Principle 35 — Intelligence Functions Are Separated

Collection, military analysis, foreign intelligence, diplomatic reporting, counterintelligence, national synthesis, policy, and coercive action are distinct functions. Intelligence informs authorized decision-makers but does not itself create policy, domestic investigative authority, or military command.

First Principle 36 — Apprehension Secures the Process; Detention Requires Greater Authority

Apprehension is a short process-securing seizure, not authority for continuing incarceration. Planned apprehension requires independent authorization; continued detention requires unanimous concurrence of three independent, non-conflicted adjudicators and a separate showing of necessity. Emergency apprehension may precede a writ only where probable cause and exigency make delay materially dangerous, and it triggers automatic prompt review.

First Principle 37 — Coercion Localizes

The level that investigates does not determine the level that coerces. A valid writ is executed at the lowest competent level where the person or property is located. Higher-level execution requires an independently reviewable showing that lower-level execution is incapable, conflicted, impaired, or inherently inadequate.

First Principle 38 — Chartering Creates Responsibility Without a Profit Motive

A chartering authority may suspend, narrow, replace, or terminate delegated authority and may recover demonstrable civic costs caused by material charter breach. It does not adjudicate its own financial claim, does not displace the injured person's redress, and may not profit from the breach it governs.

First Principle 39 — Freedom of Association Includes Freedom from Compelled Association

People may organize, speak, bargain collectively, pool resources, and withhold labor or services. Their association creates authority over the association and its consenting members only. It creates no civic power to compel membership, recognition, bargaining, employment, subsidy, or continued dealing by another party except under a voluntarily accepted contract or another independently valid Compact duty.

Decision Framework

Every proposed civic function, institution, rule, emergency power, or technology is evaluated against a common set of questions:

- Does the function protect a Founding Right, fulfill a valid delegated duty, or address a qualifying common interest?
- Can the function be performed reliably without coercive public authority?
- What is the minimum authority required?
- Can the authority be divided among independent actors?
- Is the authority traceable, time-bounded, auditable, and contestable?
- If the function is investigative, is its writ particularized and is incidental discovery prevented from silently expanding its scope?

- Who carries the burden of proof, and does it remain on the party seeking liability, investigative authority, or coercion?
- Can the subject remain silent and decline testimonial assistance without that refusal being treated as evidence or filling a gap in the claimant's proof?
- Are the evidentiary threshold and required concurrence proportional to the severity, duration, and irreversibility of the requested consequence?
- Does the process preserve and disclose material exculpatory evidence and prevent unlawfully obtained evidence from creating new authority?
- If the function is adjudicative, is relief confined to the parties, claims, property, and authority properly before the adjudicator?
- Does panel selection test relational independence among adjudicators as well as conflicts with the parties, investigators, operators, and institutions involved?
- If a person is apprehended, does the authority distinguish short process-securing custody from continued detention, and does continued detention receive the required heightened independent concurrence?
- Are consistency tools transparent and advisory, with no power to convert past decisions into binding law?
- What independent Individual Redress Instrument exists before coercion, can a claimant reach it without permission from the coercive actor, and what separate Charter Performance Security covers demonstrated civic loss from failed delegation?
- Can the institution performing the function be replaced without losing the function?
- Does urgency require provisional action, and if so, does review proceed automatically?
- Who bears the financial cost when authority is exercised wrongly, and are individual redress and civic recovery kept financially and adjudicatively separate?
- Does the mechanism preserve equal Founding Rights regardless of Representation Capital or status?
- Does the design remain valid if the current technology or current officeholders disappear?
- Is the function being performed at the lowest civic level capable of handling it without imposing material external effects on others, and if physical coercion is required, is execution routed to the lowest competent enforcement level?
- If a new rule is proposed, what gap in the General Civic Code, voluntary arrangements, adjudication, insurance, or standards makes coercive rulemaking necessary?
- If an activity creates material third-party risk, who bears the resulting loss when causation is established, and has that risk been financed before others are exposed?
- If public money is involved, does the spending remain within an existing fiscal envelope, and are debt and contingent obligations fully visible?

If the system depends upon trusting the character of the people who wield power, the architecture is incomplete.

Chapter 6 — Architecture of Civic Order

Purpose

The Civic Architecture translates the Compact and First Principles into a functional order. It defines the types of civic actors, the sources of authority, the relationship between voluntary and coercive systems, and the mechanisms through which trust and accountability are established.

The Three Institutional Classes

Open Civic Systems

Open Civic Systems perform functions through voluntary participation, competition, interoperability, and contractual choice. They exercise no special coercive authority merely because they provide a civic service.

Potential examples include competing monetary systems, contract-selected arbitration, escrow, insurance, bonding, identity and credential providers, property registries, certification bodies, marketplaces, professional associations, and private protection services.

Open Civic Systems are governed primarily by consent, contract, interoperability standards, liability, and earned trust.

Chartered Civic Operators

Chartered Civic Operators are independent organizations authorized to perform narrowly defined functions carrying delegated public authority. The charter attaches to the function rather than conferring broad governmental status upon the organization.

A Civic Enforcement Operator, for example, may receive stop, restraint, seizure, apprehension, or detention authority under a valid writ. It does not receive authority to investigate any matter it chooses, determine guilt, create regulatory rules, impose sentences, expand its jurisdiction, or convert an apprehension writ into continuing custody.

Chartered authority remains conditional. Operators maintain accreditation, an independently controlled Redress Instrument, independent audit, direct claims procedures, minimum Representation Capital, conflict controls, and continuing compliance with Compact standards.

Enduring Public Institutions

Certain functions require continuity that cannot safely depend upon ad hoc contracting or episodic institutional formation. National defense and foreign affairs are the clearest examples. Other functions may qualify only after demonstrating a similar need for enduring capacity.

Enduring status does not imply superior civic standing. Enduring institutions remain subject to external audit, independent injunction, investigation, prosecution, financial accountability, and lawful detention of officials who violate the Compact.

Foundational Education

Foundational education is a legitimate civic function because the agency protected by Individual Primacy depends in part on the development of literacy, numeracy, reasoning, creativity, communication, and the capacity to learn and participate independently. The function does not imply a public-school monopoly, a single prescribed provider, or a permanent education bureaucracy.

Families and voluntary providers may educate through private schools, cooperatives, tutors, apprenticeships, home education, digital systems, specialized academies, autonomous educational organizations, or other lawful methods. Where voluntary provision does not reliably provide every child access to a baseline foundational education, the Local Civic Unit may charter qualified education providers or establish another Compact-compliant backstop. The civic body defines the legitimate function and required outcomes; it does not have to operate the school.

Public financing, if used, does not create a right of any provider, institution, or employee association to permanent funding, exclusive delivery, compulsory recognition, or compulsory bargaining. Whether foundational education receives universal public financing, targeted backstop financing, or another arrangement remains an implementation question. Any public expenditure remains inside an authorized fiscal envelope.

Education standards should emphasize demonstrated foundational capabilities, child welfare, and meaningful provider accountability rather than prescribing a single pedagogy, institutional form, or ideological curriculum. Regional or national involvement requires the same cross-boundary, interoperability, or incapacity showing required of other higher-level civic authority.

Constitutional Actors

Individuals

Individuals are the primary holders of Founding Rights and the origin of voluntary Delegated Authority. They retain ownership of their identity, property, relationships, and private authority except where a valid protective civic function applies.

Voluntary Associations

Individuals may organize companies, communities, associations, cooperatives, charities, professional bodies, and other institutions. These entities possess only the authority their members, owners, counterparties, and governing documents lawfully grant them.

Labor Associations

Labor organizations, guilds, professional associations, worker cooperatives, and similar groups are Voluntary Associations. Members may organize, pool resources, select representatives, coordinate bargaining, withhold labor, create benefit or strike funds, provide training and insurance, establish professional standards, and enter collective agreements with willing counterparties.

No labor association receives civic authority merely from membership count, majority support, or its role in a workplace. An employer or other counterparty may recognize and negotiate with an association or decline to do so unless it has voluntarily accepted a contrary contractual duty. Civic law does not create compulsory recognition, exclusive representation, mandatory bargaining, forced membership, or a special labor-law entitlement to continued employment or dealing.

Once a labor association and a counterparty voluntarily enter a collective agreement, ordinary contract and General Civic Code remedies apply. Violence, fraud, threats, property interference, breach of contract, and other independently wrongful conduct remain governed by the same law that applies outside a labor dispute.

Local Civic Councils

Local Civic Councils are the primary elected governance bodies of Compactism. They exercise only the authority assigned to their Local Civic Unit, adopt local rules within that authority, authorize local functions, establish local budgets inside delegated fiscal limits, and designate bounded representation to the regional level.

Regional Civic Councils

Regional Civic Councils are constituted from delegates of Local Civic Councils. They act only on matters that materially cross local boundaries or are expressly delegated for regional coordination. Their authority remains derivative of the Local Civic Units that constitute them.

National Civic Council

The National Civic Council is constituted from bounded regional delegations. It governs only enumerated national functions and cross-regional matters that satisfy the Compact's jurisdictional requirements. It does not possess general legislative or executive sovereignty.

Chartered Functional Institutions

Civic Councils govern authority; Chartered Functional Institutions perform authorized functions. A council may charter an institutional implementation of an enduring or temporary civic function, define its authority and fiscal limits, and review or replace the institution without becoming its operational command hierarchy.

Technical Standards Bodies

Technical Standards Bodies develop evidence-based methods, thresholds, interoperability rules, and safe-harbor standards. They may be standing or temporary, competitive or specialized. They possess no coercive authority merely by virtue of expertise.

Independent Adjudicators

Adjudicators determine disputed facts, interpret applicable Compact terms and contractual rules, validate or reject writs, issue remedies, and review coercive action. They may practice as independent professionals or within adjudication practices; adjudicative capability does not require large permanent courts or geographically exclusive judicial districts.

Adjudicators are certified, bonded, independently audited, and subject to domain-specific Representation Capital appropriate to the authority they exercise. They do not execute their own orders, maintain enforcement forces merely by virtue of adjudicative status, or acquire broader authority because they have decided important matters.

Adjudication Registries and Independence Graphs

One or more interoperable adjudication registries maintain the qualifications needed to assemble panels without creating a permanent judicial hierarchy. A registry records certification, authorized adjudicative tiers, domain expertise, bonding, audit status, Representation Capital, current disqualifications, professional affiliations, and other information necessary for selection.

The registry also maintains an Independence Graph capable of screening relationships among prospective adjudicators and between adjudicators and the participants in a matter. Hard conflicts include financial interest, family relationship, prior participation in the matter, same practice, representation of a party, material business relationships, and recent supervisory relationships.

Relational conflicts may include recent service on the same adjudicative panel, repeated pairings over a rolling period, shared governing boards, recurring professional dependencies, recent mentorship, or other relationships likely to create habitual decisional alignment. A cooling period such as twelve months may be an operating standard where the qualified pool is large enough; the enduring principle is to minimize recurring panel relationships whenever sufficient qualified alternatives exist.

Registries themselves remain auditable, interoperable, and replaceable. No registry gains authority to control outcomes merely because it supplies candidate pools, conflict data, or panel-selection infrastructure.

Investigation Operators

Investigation Operators develop evidence only within particularized investigative authority. They may identify incidental subjects and request supplemental writs, but they do not expand their own jurisdiction, adjudicate guilt, execute coercive judgments, or control claims arising from their conduct.

Accreditors and Auditors

Accreditors determine whether a Chartered Civic Operator continues to meet objective Compact requirements. Auditors examine records, authority chains, outcomes, claims, Redress Instruments, conflicts, and compliance. Neither function is performed solely by the operator being evaluated or by the department whose actions depend upon the operator.

Civic Enforcement Operators

Civic Enforcement Operators execute valid coercive authority. Their constitutional role is intentionally narrow and geographically particularized. They do not originate public policy, define protected resources, adjudicate claims, sentence individuals, operate indefinite custody simply because they execute a writ, or acquire nationwide field jurisdiction because another national function originated the matter.

Secure Custody Operators

Secure Custody Operators provide safe confinement when a valid adjudicative order requires it. They do not arrest, prosecute, sentence, or determine release dates. Their compensation is designed to avoid financial incentives for more arrests, longer confinement, or harsher conditions.

Sources of Authority

Concept	Compactist meaning
Delegated Authority	Authority voluntarily granted by an individual or organization for a defined purpose and scope. It is revocable according to the terms of the delegation.
Protective Authority	Authority to stop or remedy a violation of Founding Rights. It does not depend upon the offender's consent.
Stewardship Authority	Authority expressly created by the Compact to protect qualifying shared interests against irreversible or substantial nonconsensual harm.

Concept	Compactist meaning
Provisional Authority	Temporary authority to preserve reversibility when delay itself creates the harm. It triggers automatic independent review and expires unless validated.
Joint Mandate	Temporary cross-functional authority created for an incident requiring coordinated action among otherwise independent public functions.
Investigative Authority	Authority to obtain and analyze specified evidence concerning a defined subject, matter, and purpose under a particularized writ. Incidental discovery does not expand the writ and requires supplemental authority for continued investigation.
Representative Authority	Authority carried upward by a delegate under a bounded Mandate Writ from a Local Civic Council to a Regional Civic Council or from a Regional Civic Council to the National Civic Council.
Rulemaking Authority	Authority of a Civic Council to enact a generally binding civic rule only within valid jurisdiction after the required necessity, development, notice, and ratification process.
Fiscal Authority	Bounded authority to levy and allocate the Compact-authorized consumption tax within a delegated fiscal envelope. Increasing the envelope requires authorization from below.

Representation Capital

Representation Capital measures earned trust through demonstrated reliability and outcomes. It is not a popularity score, moral worth score, membership score, or measure of social conformity.

In civic order, Representation Capital may influence selection, bonding requirements, accreditation, delegated responsibility, contractual terms, and eligibility to exercise specialized authority. It never changes Founding Rights or equal civic standing.

Representation Capital may be domain-specific. An institution may possess high trust in engineering inspection and little or no trust in adjudication. A single universal score risks recreating centralized social control and is inconsistent with Individual Primacy.

Systemic misconduct affects Representation Capital according to scope, severity, sensitivity, duration, culpability, concealment, recurrence, and remedial conduct rather than by simple popularity or raw complaint count. Large-scale or integrity-level violations can trigger mandatory audit, suspension, or loss of authority independently of ordinary score movement.

Redress Instruments

Every institution authorized to exercise coercive power maintains a Redress Instrument before that authority is used. A Redress Instrument may take the form of a bond, insurance layer, independent escrow, funded trust, reserve facility, or other mechanism capable of paying valid claims while remaining outside the coercive actor's unilateral control.

The claimant's right to payment is independent of disputes between the operator, insurer, bond provider, or funding institution. Internal coverage disputes occur behind the redress mechanism and do not become a second barrier between an injured person and an adjudicated award.

The Civic Mandate

A future implementation may give each adult a portable Civic Mandate recording explicit delegations and civic relationships: selected arbitrators, identity providers, insurers, protection services, estate representatives, emergency delegates, and other chosen institutions.

The Civic Mandate does not constitute consent to unlimited public authority. It records actual delegations. Functions arising directly from the Compact, such as narrowly defined Protective or Stewardship Authority, identify their own source independently.

Open Protocols

Compactism benefits from common protocols that allow institutions to interoperate without requiring common ownership. Identity, writs, judgments, bonding, audit records, Representation Capital attestations, property claims, and delegations may all use interoperable formats capable of independent verification.

The protocol is common. Providers remain plural.

Chapter 7 — Authority, Adjudication, Enforcement, and Custody

Purpose

This chapter defines the architecture of legitimate coercion. It addresses the point at which voluntary civic systems are insufficient and one party, institution, or offender refuses to comply.

Compactism does not attempt to remove force from civic order. It attempts to make force divisible, traceable, independently authorized, proportionate, and financially accountable.

The Coercive Chain

A coercive matter normally passes through distinct functions:

- Claim or protective trigger
- Particularized investigation and evidence development
- Burden assignment and validation of the applicable evidentiary threshold
- Adjudication or provisional authorization
- Writ of authority
- Enforcement
- Apprehension or other execution at the lowest competent enforcement level
- Continued detention only under separately authorized liberty-restriction authority
- Custody or remedy when required
- Independent audit, appeal, and claims

The same organization does not control the entire sequence. Separation may vary by circumstance, but no institution is permitted to create the claim, conclusively adjudicate it, execute the coercion, control the appeal, and determine its own liability.

Authority Writs

Every nontrivial coercive action carries an Authority Writ. A writ identifies the source of authority, facts or evidence supporting the action, the applicable evidentiary standard, the party carrying the burden, the permitted coercive powers, affected persons or property, duration, issuing adjudicator or valid provisional source, geographic execution scope, executing operator or routing rule, challenge process, and the Individual Redress Instrument covering wrongful execution. Where the operator acts under a civic charter, the authority record also identifies the applicable Charter Performance Security.

Public office creates no evidentiary presumption. The applicant for a writ must establish the required factual and legal basis; the subject has no duty to disprove the allegation or cooperate in constructing the showing. Where authority is challenged, the actor asserting continued coercive power remains responsible for demonstrating that the authority exists and remains within scope.

Digital implementation may make the authority chain machine-verifiable in real time. The constitutional requirement is independent of the technology: coercive authority must be demonstrable before or immediately after the act, depending upon urgency.

Where the applicable adjudicative tier requires multiple signatures, the writ also records the concurring adjudicators, their independent affiliations, conflict-screening attestations, and the quorum required for issuance. A writ that lacks the required independent concurrence is defective even when its substantive claim might otherwise be valid.

Investigative Authority and Particularity

Investigative writs are subject to heightened particularity. They identify a defined person, organization, account, property, transaction, event, or identifiable unknown subject supported by articulable evidence. They also identify the information sought, the relevant period, the investigative purpose, authorized recipients, retention conditions, and limits on secondary use.

A writ may name multiple subjects when each falls within the supported matter. It may not substitute a broad political, religious, associational, demographic, commercial, or other population class for particularized evidence merely because population-scale collection is more efficient.

When an authorized investigation incidentally identifies another subject, the discovered material is quarantined except for the limited purpose of evaluating and seeking a Supplemental Writ. Continued collection, broader analysis, dissemination, or coercive use concerning the new subject requires supplemental authority within a short, predefined interval. If authority is denied or the interval expires, collection stops and unnecessary material is returned, destroyed, or cryptographically sealed according to the governing protocol.

Certain information revealing political, religious, labor, advocacy, journalistic, or similarly sensitive associations receives heightened protection because compelled collection can expose relationships and beliefs extending far beyond the original investigative subject. Such collection requires explicit relevance, narrow scope, controlled dissemination, and accelerated review.

The investigative subject has no duty to assist in proving the allegation. Silence, refusal to answer, or refusal to provide testimonial assistance does not create probable cause, supply missing proof, or justify expansion of the writ.

A valid particularized writ may authorize investigators or enforcement operators to search for and seize independently existing physical evidence, property, or data, and may compel a third-party custodian to produce independently existing records within the writ's scope. The subject cannot be compelled to create an explanation, reconstruction, accounting, or record for the investigation; authenticate incriminating material through a testimonial act;

or disclose a memorized password, cryptographic key, secret, or credential for the purpose of proving wrongdoing.

Investigators exercising Compact authority have an affirmative duty to preserve and disclose material exculpatory evidence. Evidence that materially undermines the allegation, reduces the apparent severity, supports an alternative explanation, or bears on the necessity of coercion is part of the adjudicative record rather than property of the investigating theory. Deliberate fabrication, destruction, suppression, or concealment of such evidence is an Integrity Failure.

Evidence obtained outside valid authority cannot be used to bootstrap new investigative or coercive authority. Evidence later obtained through a demonstrably independent lawful source may be considered, but the independence of that source must be documented and reviewable.

Suspicion may expand. Authority does not.

The investigator gathers the evidence. The subject does not build the case.

Presumption, Burdens of Proof, and Evidentiary Thresholds

Every person enters a coercive proceeding presumed free of wrongdoing. The party asking the civic order to impose liability, guilt, search, seizure, restraint, confinement, punishment, or another nonconsensual consequence bears the burden necessary to justify that consequence. The respondent does not inherit the burden of proving innocence merely because an allegation has been filed, a writ has been requested, or a lower panel has ruled against them.

Burden follows the proposition being asserted. A private claimant proves the elements of a private claim. An investigator proves the basis for investigative authority. An enforcement or public actor challenged on jurisdiction proves the validity and scope of the authority it is exercising. A claimant seeking damages beyond an automatic or established remedy proves the additional loss.

Evidentiary standards rise with the consequence of error. Ordinary private liability may use a preponderance standard. Major deprivations of property or important civil interests may require clear and convincing evidence. Investigative writs require a defined showing tied to the intrusion requested, with heightened standards for protected information. Pre-adjudication confinement requires a distinct and substantial showing of necessity and danger. Punitive guilt and prolonged punitive confinement require the highest standard, ordinarily proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Emergency provisional authority may use a lower threshold only when delay itself threatens imminent serious or irreversible harm. The lower threshold justifies only the

temporary, least-destructive action needed to preserve reversibility. Continued coercion requires the higher burden applicable to the permanent consequence.

Silence is evidentially neutral. Refusal to testify, answer incriminating questions, disclose memorized secrets or credentials, or provide testimonial assistance cannot be treated as proof of wrongdoing or as a reason to increase the requested coercion.

The exact evidentiary formulations are operating standards subject to refinement. The constitutional rule is permanent: the greater the coercive consequence, the greater the proof required, and the burden remains with the party asking the civic order to impose it.

The greater the coercive consequence, the greater the proof required.

Apprehension and Continued Detention

Compactism distinguishes the act of bringing a person into the civic process from the decision to keep that person confined. Apprehension is a short process-securing seizure. Continued detention is ongoing physical custody after prompt review. The two require different authority because the duration, reversibility, and risk of error differ materially.

Writ of Apprehension

A planned Writ of Apprehension requires one independent, non-conflicted adjudicator selected through the qualified registry. The applicant must make a particularized probable-cause showing connecting the identified person to the specified offense or actionable conduct and must establish a legitimate need for physical apprehension rather than ordinary voluntary appearance.

A Writ of Apprehension may be justified by circumstances such as credible flight risk, ongoing serious unlawful conduct, material danger to another person, likely witness intimidation, or imminent destruction of critical evidence. The writ authorizes only the short custody reasonably necessary to locate, secure, transport, identify, and bring the person before prompt review. It does not itself authorize continued detention pending adjudication.

Emergency Apprehension

An authorized enforcement operator may apprehend without a prior writ when particularized probable cause exists and a defined exigency makes waiting materially dangerous to life, public safety, the integrity of critical evidence, or the realistic ability to secure the person. The operator records both the probable-cause basis and the exigency. Automatic expedited adjudicative review follows.

Emergency authority is not a convenience exception. If the exigency is not sustained on review, continued custody ends and wrongful apprehension remains subject to redress and audit.

Writ of Continued Detention

Continued detention is a separate coercive act. To hold a person beyond the short apprehension period, the applicant must obtain unanimous concurrence from three independently selected, non-conflicted adjudicators. Each adjudicator renders an independent written determination before learning the other determinations.

The applicant must establish both the required factual basis for the underlying matter and why physical detention is necessary rather than a less restrictive measure. Flight restrictions, secured appearance, monitoring, no-contact requirements, preservation orders, or other reversible mechanisms are preferred when they can adequately protect the process and other people.

If unanimous authorization is not obtained before the apprehension period expires, the person is released from physical custody subject only to separately authorized lesser restrictions. A pending application, resubmission, or interpretive challenge does not itself extend custody.

Apprehension secures the process. Continued detention requires a separate justification for taking liberty.

Divisible Coercive Authority

Concept	**Compactist meaning**
Stop Authority	Power to order an activity halted temporarily to prevent immediate harm.
Restraint Authority	Power to use proportionate physical control to prevent continued unlawful action.
Seizure Authority	Power to take temporary or permanent control of specified property pursuant to a valid writ or emergency condition.
Apprehension Authority	Power to take an identified person into short temporary custody to secure appearance, stop immediate serious unlawful conduct, prevent imminent flight, or bring the person promptly before the civic process under a valid Writ of Apprehension or defined exigent authority.

Concept	Compactist meaning
Detention Authority	Power to continue physical custody beyond the apprehension period under a separately authorized Writ of Continued Detention. It requires the heightened independent concurrence and necessity showing established for deprivation of liberty.
Custodial Authority	Power to maintain confinement under an existing order, without power to determine guilt or sentence duration.
Defensive Force Authority	Power to use proportionate force against an immediate threat.
Lethal Force Authority	Power to use deadly force only against an imminent threat of death or grave bodily harm, not merely to protect property, collect money, or enforce ordinary compliance.

Chartered Civic Enforcement

Civic Enforcement Operators resemble highly disciplined, bonded execution services more than conventional police agencies. They are activated by valid authority rather than by broad self-originated jurisdiction.

Minimum charter requirements include:

- Enumerated coercive powers and prohibited powers.
- A funded or guaranteed Individual Redress Instrument sufficient to compensate wrongful action and controlled independently of the operator.
- Charter Performance Security sufficient to cover demonstrable civic costs caused by material breach of the operator's charter, with claims determined independently of the chartering authority.
- Independent accreditation against Compact standards.
- Annual full-scope audit and continuous auditability of coercive transactions.
- Minimum domain-specific Representation Capital.
- Open claims and expedited challenge procedures.
- Direct claimant access to independent adjudication without operator permission, exhaustion of internal remedies, or control of the forum.
- Executable redress awards that do not require operator consent or discretionary budget approval.

- External investigation of serious misconduct.
- No compensation tied to arrests, seizures, fines, convictions, or duration of custody.
- Automatic suspension or loss of authority when accreditation, redress capacity, or Representation Capital falls below required thresholds.
- Individual accountability for corruption, evidence fabrication, knowing excess of authority, or serious intentional misconduct.

Locality of Coercive Execution

The civic level that investigates a matter does not determine the civic level that physically executes the resulting writ. A national or regional investigator may develop evidence and obtain a valid Compact-wide writ, but physical execution ordinarily routes to the lowest competent Civic Enforcement Operator where the person or property is located.

The executing operator does not relitigate the merits. It authenticates the writ, verifies the subject and scope, confirms that the requested coercive powers remain valid, confirms required redress coverage, and executes only the authority actually granted.

Execution Impairment and Escalation

Execution may escalate when lower-level capability is unavailable, conflicted, compromised, refuses valid authority without lawful basis, cannot meet the required latency, or is inherently inadequate to a simultaneous cross-regional operation. Those conditions constitute Execution Impairment and must be independently reviewable rather than declared unilaterally by the investigating body.

Regional execution becomes eligible when local execution is impaired. National direct execution remains exceptional and requires an additional jurisdictional predicate beyond the underlying writ, such as a genuinely cross-regional simultaneous operation, foreign-directed terrorism or sabotage, a fugitive deliberately using regional boundaries to defeat execution, or documented lower-level impairment.

National Coordination Without General National Police Power

The national level may maintain enduring coordination, interoperability, authentication, and rapid-routing capability without maintaining a general domestic enforcement monopoly. National-eligible personnel may ordinarily be drawn from qualified local and regional operators and assembled into temporary joint teams for the particular operation.

A coordinated national operation does not give every participating operator open-ended national jurisdiction. Each team receives only the subjects, places, timing, and coercive powers assigned by the authenticated operation. When the operation ends, the temporary concentration of execution authority dissolves.

National investigation does not imply national arrest power.

Protective Services Are Different

A private protection service protects a client, location, or property under voluntary agreement. It may exercise ordinary defensive rights and narrowly defined emergency powers but does not thereby become a Civic Enforcement Operator.

A Chartered Civic Enforcement Operator executes authority recognized by the Compact against parties who may not consent. That distinction requires stronger accreditation, bonding, transparency, audit, and procedural controls.

Independent Adjudication

Adjudication is a civic function rather than a permanent branch of government. Qualified adjudicators may be individuals or members of independent practices. Contracting parties may select adjudicators in advance; nonconsensual matters are constituted from qualified registries under common Compact standards. Judgments remain interoperable even though the adjudicators and practices that issue them remain plural.

Adjudicative authority is particularized. An ordinary panel resolves the people, claims, property, conduct, and authority properly before it. It does not obtain general lawmaking authority merely because the dispute raises an important issue. The greater the coercive consequence sought, the greater the required independence, quorum, evidentiary threshold, and review. The panel does not presume the claimant, investigator, or public actor correct because of status; it tests whether that party has carried the burden assigned to it.

Panel Selection

For consensual disputes, the parties may jointly select a qualified adjudicator or panel. When they have not done so, the registry produces a qualified candidate pool after objective conflict screening. Each party may receive an equal and limited number of discretionary strikes, while actual conflicts require disqualification. The final panel is selected randomly or by another neutral rule from the remaining qualified candidates.

A party cannot defeat adjudication by refusing to approve every candidate. Agreement is preferred where possible, but nonparticipation or strategic veto does not prevent a valid panel from being constituted under the agreed rules or Compact procedure.

Relational Independence

Conflict screening is pairwise across the entire panel. Each adjudicator must be sufficiently independent of the parties, representatives, investigators, enforcement operators, interested institutions, and every other adjudicator on the panel.

Formal organizational separation is insufficient by itself. Recent co-panel service, repeated pairings, shared financial interests, common governance, recent supervision or mentorship, recurring business relationships, and similar dependencies may disqualify a

pairing. Operating standards may establish cooling periods and maximum repeat-pairing limits based upon the size and specialization of the qualified pool.

For higher coercive tiers, required concurrence comes from independently affiliated adjudicators rather than several people whose practical loyalties originate in the same practice, employer, appointing authority, or recurring panel network.

Adjudicative Tiers and Quorum

The Compact establishes consequence-scaled concurrence. Most quorum sizes remain operating choices, but this draft constitutionalizes two liberty minima: one independent adjudicator for a planned Writ of Apprehension and unanimous concurrence of three independent adjudicators for continued detention.

- Tier I — Ordinary disputes. A low-value or routine claim may be decided by one jointly selected adjudicator. If no single adjudicator is jointly selected, a three-adjudicator panel may be constituted from the registry. The claimant carries the burden, ordinarily by a preponderance of the evidence unless the parties adopted a different lawful standard.
- Tier II — Significant civil authority. Major property judgments, substantial asset restraints, invasive discovery, and similarly consequential civil matters use a three-adjudicator panel with relational-independence screening and a heightened evidentiary standard, ordinarily clear and convincing evidence where the remedy creates a serious deprivation.
- Tier III — Coercive writs. Searches, seizures, substantial property restraints, protected-information access, and comparable nonconsensual authority generally require concurrence proportionate to the intrusion, ordinarily from multiple independently affiliated adjudicators for the most consequential non-liberty actions. Protected information requires a heightened showing. A valid emergency rule may permit temporary action followed by immediate review.
- Tier IV — Apprehension. A planned Writ of Apprehension requires one independent, non-conflicted adjudicator and a particularized probable-cause showing. A defined exigency may permit immediate apprehension without prior issuance, followed by automatic prompt review. The writ authorizes only short process-securing custody.
- Tier V — Continued detention and prolonged confinement. Continued detention requires unanimous concurrence of three independently selected, non-conflicted adjudicators and a distinct high showing of necessity. Prolonged pre-adjudication detention is periodically reauthorized by a newly constituted higher-quorum panel; a working implementation may require four of five to continue custody. Punitive guilt and long-term punitive confinement require the highest burden of proof, ordinarily beyond a reasonable doubt.

- Tier VI — Compact Review. System-wide invalidation of asserted public authority is reserved to a larger ad hoc panel drawn from the qualified registry, with heightened independence and a supermajority requirement.

The one-adjudicator minimum for planned apprehension and unanimous three-adjudicator minimum for continued detention are constitutional safeguards in this draft. Other quorum sizes, review intervals, and supermajority formulas remain implementation choices unless later incorporated into the Compact.

Appeal and Finality

Every adjudicator approving or denying coercive authority states the factual and Compact basis for the determination. A denial identifies the defect clearly enough to distinguish insufficient evidence, missing jurisdiction, disproportionality, procedural failure, unlawful evidence, or another defined deficiency. Reasoned determinations support audit and consistency without creating binding precedent.

A denied Writ of Apprehension may receive one review by a newly constituted three-adjudicator panel selected independently of the applicant. A majority of that panel may issue the writ under the same substantive standard. If the review also fails, another application requires material new evidence, materially changed circumstances, or correction of an identified defect. The applicant may not reroll adjudicators until a favorable panel appears.

Failure to obtain unanimous authorization for continued detention leaves the requested authority uncreated. The coercive requester has no ordinary appeal merely to seek a more favorable panel; a renewed application requires material new evidence, changed circumstances, or correction of an identified defect and discloses the prior determinations. A disputed legal interpretation may be referred to Compact Review, but Compact Review resolves the legal question rather than itself ordering detention.

A person whose continued detention has been authorized may appeal promptly to a newly constituted five-adjudicator panel. The party seeking continued custody retains the burden; the detained person does not acquire a burden to prove entitlement to freedom merely because the initial panel acted. A working implementation may require at least four of five to continue detention on appeal.

Ordinary non-liberty adjudication retains one meaningful appeal rather than an indefinite institutional ladder. After the authorized appeal, the matter becomes final except for defined integrity failures such as fraud, concealed conflict, newly discovered evidence meeting a high threshold, or a properly referred Compact Review question.

Adjudicative Consistency Layer

Every completed decision enters a structured adjudicative corpus containing the material facts, Compact provisions, governing agreements or rules, evidentiary standard,

reasoning, remedy, panel composition, appeal outcome, and subsequent treatment. The corpus creates visibility across a distributed adjudicative system without creating a hierarchy of courts.

AI-enabled consistency systems may compare a pending matter with materially similar decisions, identify competing interpretations, surface factual distinctions, and flag a Material Consistency Deviation when a proposed interpretation ranges materially outside established application. The system recommends; it never adjudicates.

A material deviation does not make a decision invalid. The adjudicator may conclude that prior decisions were wrong or materially distinguishable, but must explain the departure. The consistency analysis and the adjudicator's explanation become part of the appeal record and may receive heightened scrutiny on appeal.

The consistency layer is transparent and contestable. The parties and adjudicators can inspect the prior decisions relied upon and the basis for comparison. Multiple independently certified consistency engines may coexist so that no single model becomes a hidden source of precedent. No AI system may decide disputed facts, issue a writ, impose a remedy, or create binding law.

Representation Capital does not punish an adjudicator merely for disagreeing with prior decisions. It reflects demonstrated reliability: procedural compliance, conflict disclosure, quality and transparency of reasoning, findings on appeal, audit results, and adjudicated misconduct. Legitimate doctrinal correction must remain possible.

Past decisions inform judgment. They do not own it.

Compact Review

An ordinary adjudicator may enjoin or remedy an unlawful action as applied to the parties and property before the panel. If the panel concludes that the underlying rule, charter, or asserted public authority itself may be invalid under the Compact, it may refer that constitutional question for Compact Review.

Compact Review is performed by a large, temporary, independently constituted panel rather than a permanent supreme court. Its members are selected from highly qualified adjudicators under heightened conflict and relational-independence rules. A supermajority may invalidate the challenged authority system-wide when the question properly requires system-wide resolution.

The Compact Review panel dissolves when the matter ends. Its decision resolves the constitutional question presented but does not create a permanent judicial office or general legislative authority.

Provisional Protective Orders

When delay creates imminent irreversible harm, an authorized function may issue a narrow Provisional Protective Order before full adjudication. Examples include stopping destruction of an irreplaceable protected resource, restraining an immediate threat, freezing a specific asset likely to disappear, or isolating an acute danger.

The order automatically triggers independent review. It expires unless validated within the period specified by the Compact or applicable charter. Wrongful intervention creates a direct compensation claim against the preexisting Redress Instrument covering the actor or institution responsible for the intervention.

The actor seeking continuation bears the burden at review. The subject's refusal to testify or assist cannot be used to convert a provisional order into permanent authority.

Preserve reversibility first. Adjudicate permanence second.

Irreversible Civic Harm

The greater the irreversible harm government itself can create, the greater the required evidentiary threshold and independent authorization. Business closure, destruction of property, prolonged asset restraint, removal of children, lengthy confinement, and other life-altering actions require heightened review except where immediate action is necessary to prevent equal or greater irreversible harm.

Secure Custody

Compactism treats confinement as a function rather than an institution entitled to prisoners. Secure Custody exists for incapacitation of demonstrated dangerousness, defined pre-adjudication necessity, execution of a valid sentence or remedy, and conditions necessary for eventual safe return.

The remedial hierarchy favors restitution, bonding, monitored liberty, restrictions, and other reversible mechanisms before secure custody when those mechanisms can adequately protect others and execute the judgment.

Secure Custody begins only under an authority appropriate to its duration. A Writ of Apprehension supports only the short custody necessary to secure the person and bring them before prompt review. Continued detention requires unanimous concurrence of three independent adjudicators, and prolonged detention requires renewed higher-quorum review. Punitive confinement follows only from the final merits process and the burden applicable to that consequence.

At every confinement review, the party seeking continued custody carries the applicable burden. The confined person is not required to prove innocence, rehabilitation, or the absence of danger merely because custody already exists.

Custody providers are independently accredited, audited, bonded, and scored through Representation Capital. They cannot profit from longer sentences by setting sentence length, and their compensation structure is insulated from incentives to increase confinement.

Claims Against Authority

A person harmed by coercive authority may file directly with an independent adjudicator. The institution whose action is challenged cannot require internal exhaustion, select the adjudicator, prevent filing, control the evidence necessary to establish the claim, or veto payment of a valid award.

In a challenge to the existence or scope of coercive authority, the actor asserting that authority bears the burden of demonstrating its validity. Once an authority violation and baseline remedy are established, a claimant seeking additional consequential damages bears the burden only as to those additional losses.

Where the authority chain is invalid, materially exceeded, fabricated, or exercised with defined negligence or misconduct, redress may include restoration of property, lost income, legal expense, direct consequential loss, and additional remedies established under the Compact. Objectively calculable loss may be paid immediately, while disputed consequential damages proceed through adjudication.

Good-faith officials acting reasonably inside a valid writ are not personally ruined for every error. The institutional Redress Instrument carries ordinary error risk. Personal exposure attaches to corruption, knowing overreach, evidence fabrication, concealment, deliberate circumvention of writ limits, or similarly serious misconduct.

Redress Instruments and Payment Independence

Redress capacity exists before coercion. The coercive actor does not hold the assets in an account it can freeze, withdraw, redirect, or condition upon settlement. A first-loss reserve may be held in independent trust or escrow and supplemented by bonding, insurance, reinsurance, or other external guarantees.

Once an adjudicator enters an executable award, the Redress Instrument pays according to its rules without needing approval from the entity that caused the loss. An appeal may challenge the award, but an actor seeking to delay payment may be required to post additional security so that the injured party does not finance the appeal.

Coverage disputes between an operator and its insurer, bond provider, reserve administrator, or other backer do not suspend the claimant's right to payment. Those institutions allocate the ultimate loss among themselves after the claimant is paid.

Charter Performance Security and Failed Delegation

Individual redress and charter-performance remedies protect different interests. The Individual Redress Instrument makes a person harmed by wrongful coercion whole. Charter Performance Security reimburses the chartering civic unit for objectively demonstrated costs created by material failure of the delegated function, such as emergency replacement, required deep audit, records reconstruction, claimant notification, continuity measures, or re-procurement.

The chartering authority does not determine its own financial entitlement. An independent adjudicator determines whether a material charter breach occurred, what civic costs were causally produced by that breach, and whether oversight failure by the chartering authority itself contributed to the loss.

A civic unit may recover demonstrated loss but may not profit from operator misconduct. Punitive monetary assessments, if authorized for deterrence beyond compensation, flow to an independently governed Civic Redress Reserve or another nonbeneficiary mechanism rather than to the discretionary budget of the body that initiated the claim.

The same incident may therefore produce separate consequences: direct redress to injured people, reimbursement of actual civic costs, limitation or withdrawal of the charter, RepCap degradation, accreditation consequences, and personal liability for culpable misconduct. None substitutes for another.

Redress repairs wrongful harm. Charter remedies repair failed delegation. Certification consequences protect the system from future failure.

Systemic Authority Violations

When one adjudicated practice affects a large class of people through the same invalid authority, the system may establish a Systemic Authority Violation. A common liability finding identifies the affected cohort, triggers notice, and supports automatic baseline redress without requiring every person to discover the violation and litigate the same threshold question independently.

Individual claimants retain the ability to seek additional redress for actual losses exceeding the baseline remedy. The existence of a cohort does not erase individual standing; it removes needless duplication in proving the same institutional violation.

Audit, Suspension, and Integrity Thresholds

Certain events automatically trigger a deep external audit regardless of current Representation Capital. Triggers may include population-scale collection, unauthorized access to protected associational information, evidence fabrication, systemic writ-scope failure, concealment of unauthorized collection, repeated wrongful coercion, or a large affected claimant cohort.

Representation Capital degrades according to the demonstrated severity of the failure, including scope, sensitivity, duration, culpability, concealment, recurrence, and remedial conduct. Falling below a defined Authority Threshold automatically suspends the ability to obtain or execute new coercive authority until recertification.

Some conduct constitutes an Integrity Failure independent of the numeric score. Deliberate fabrication, intentional evasion of writ limits, destruction or concealment of material exculpatory evidence, concealed population-scale collection, knowing use of unlawfully obtained evidence to bootstrap new authority, or systematic use of authority outside the Compact may support immediate suspension or decertification even when prior Representation Capital was high.

Chapter 8 — Representative Governance and Civic Delegation

Purpose

Compactism retains representative government while rejecting generalized political sovereignty. This chapter defines how civic authority originates locally, moves upward only when necessary, and remains bounded through Mandate Writs, limited jurisdiction, short service, and separation between governance and operations.

The Local Civic Unit

The Local Civic Unit is the primary democratic jurisdiction. Existing counties may serve as the default implementation where their scale and coherence are suitable, but the Compact does not constitutionalize present county boundaries. Very large jurisdictions may subdivide; very small jurisdictions may combine or share functions.

Boundaries are established through neutral criteria such as population range, contiguity, existing communities, access, geography, and administrative viability. Partisan voting history, expected electoral advantage, and candidate preference are not legitimate boundary criteria.

Locality is constitutional. The historical boundary is implementation.

Direct Local Elections

Members directly elect the Local Civic Council. Local elections are the principal recurring act of political delegation because the local level is closest to the people whose lives and property are affected by civic decisions.

Political terms remain short with a two-year term as the working model and favors strong limits on repeated service. Exact staggering, cooling periods, and lifetime or consecutive-service restrictions remain implementation parameters to be tested against the need for continuity.

Mandate Writs

A representative does not receive generalized authority to govern. Each delegate carries a Mandate Writ stating the jurisdiction, subject domains, fiscal limits, voting authority, duration, reporting duties, and any restrictions attached to the delegation.

A vote or act outside the Mandate Writ is not merely a political breach; it is an authority defect subject to challenge. Mandate Writs are public, machine-verifiable where technology permits, and terminate automatically with the delegation.

Regional Civic Councils

Local Civic Councils designate a small number of delegates to the Regional Civic Council. Multiple delegates are preferred where practicable so an entire Local Civic Unit is not

represented through a single personality, but the Compact does not fix one permanent number.

Regional jurisdiction exists for matters that materially cross Local Civic Unit boundaries, require regional interoperability, or are explicitly delegated upward. Regional authority is not superior local authority. It is a different scope of authority.

The National Civic Council

Regional Civic Councils designate bounded delegates to the National Civic Council. National jurisdiction is limited to enumerated national functions and matters whose effects or required coordination genuinely cross regional boundaries.

The National Civic Council does not become a sovereign legislature merely because it is national. It cannot expand its own jurisdiction, acquire authority over matters that remain local or regional, or treat a majority vote as a source of otherwise absent power.

No General Executive Branch

Each Civic Council selects its own procedural leadership: a Convener or Chair, deputy, clerk, and other administrative roles necessary to conduct the body's work. These offices organize procedure; they do not possess general executive command.

The National Convener cannot command Defense, direct Foreign Affairs, issue general decrees, independently spend public funds, order enforcement, or override another chartered function. Functional command exists inside the function that requires it.

Functional executive authority does not create general executive authority.

Councils Govern Authority; Institutions Perform Functions

Civic Councils authorize, charter, fund, review, renew, and terminate civic functions within their jurisdiction. They do not ordinarily operate those functions directly.

A charter defines mission, powers, prohibited powers, funding limits, leadership method, succession, audit, RepCap requirements, redress, reporting, renewal, and termination. The operating institution chooses or develops professional leadership according to the charter rather than through routine political patronage.

Enduring Functions and Replaceable Institutions

Some functions are established directly by the Compact because their continuity is indispensable. National Defense is the clearest example, but its enduring status does not require a single national military institution. The Compact establishes the defense obligation; Regional and National Civic Councils charter the distributed institutions that satisfy it. A Civic Council therefore does not decide whether the function exists; it charters, funds, and reviews the institutional implementation within its jurisdiction.

The institution can be reorganized, divided, competitively replaced, automated, or terminated while the authorized function continues.

The function may be permanent. The institution never is.

Jurisdictional Escalation

A matter begins at the lowest level reasonably capable of resolving it. Movement upward requires a demonstrated boundary-crossing effect, inability of the lower jurisdictions to resolve the problem reliably, or an express Compact assignment to the higher level.

A higher Civic Council does not adjudicate the validity of its own jurisdiction. If jurisdiction is challenged, independent Compact adjudication decides the authority question without deciding the underlying policy.

Legal Pluralism and Interjurisdictional Conflict

Different Local or Regional Civic Units may adopt different lawful approaches. Divergence is not itself a defect. Uniformity becomes a civic concern when the divergence materially burdens parties outside the jurisdiction, prevents necessary interoperability, or creates a qualifying externalized harm.

Interjurisdictional conflict proceeds first through negotiation, interoperability agreements, mediation, and adjudication of rights or boundaries. Creating a higher-level rule is a last resort rather than the default response to difference.

Persistent Knowledge Without Permanent Political Control

Aggressive political rotation can unintentionally transfer real power to permanent staff. Compactism therefore distinguishes persistent knowledge from decision authority. Clerks, records, technical analysis, AI systems, financial systems, and professional support may persist; they do not acquire policy votes, jurisdictional discretion, or authority to restrict what elected delegates may consider.

Turnover may be staggered so an entire body does not lose institutional memory simultaneously. Cooling periods may limit immediate movement from political service into regulated operators, lobbying roles, or higher-level representation.

Knowledge may persist. Political authority rotates.

Decision Framework for Governance

- Can the matter be resolved by individuals, voluntary organizations, or the Local Civic Unit?
- What specific cross-boundary fact justifies regional or national jurisdiction?
- What authority is actually contained in the delegate's Mandate Writ?
- Is the Council governing authority or improperly operating the function itself?
- Can the institutional implementation be replaced without changing the civic function?

- Has persistent staff or technical infrastructure acquired practical political control?

Chapter 9 — General Law, Rulemaking, and Standards

Purpose

Compactism seeks to govern broad classes of conduct with a small body of durable general law before creating specific rules. The objective is not the absence of law. It is to avoid turning every undesirable event into another permanent prescriptive command.

The General Civic Code

The General Civic Code sits below the Compact and above specific civic rules. It provides sufficiently defined legal elements so adjudicators apply law rather than gradually creating it through accumulated precedent.

The Code should remain compact enough for ordinary people and institutions to understand its core duties. It may define, among other subjects:

- wrongful material harm and causation;
- intent, recklessness, negligence, and strict risk responsibility;
- fraud, deception, concealment, and misrepresentation;
- property interference and restitution;
- consent, assumption of risk, and voluntary waiver within Founding Rights;
- duties created by conduct, relationships, roles, and risk creation;
- self-defense and defense of others;
- organizational and decision-holder responsibility;
- available remedies and evidentiary requirements.

Generalized Duty Before Prescriptive Rule

A recurring bad outcome does not automatically justify a new rule. The first question is whether the General Civic Code already supplies a duty, cause of action, remedy, risk-allocation mechanism, or basis for insurance and standards sufficient to address the conduct.

Specific civic rules are justified when the general law cannot provide sufficient predictability, interoperability, prevention, or protection against material externalized harm.

Voluntary Labor Association and Collective Bargaining

Labor association is governed by the same principles of consent, contract, property, and responsibility as other voluntary association. Members may coordinate bargaining or collectively withhold labor. Employers may bargain collectively, individually, or decline a proposed bargaining relationship. Neither side gains coercive authority over the other merely by organizing.

No separate labor-relations authority exists merely to compel recognition, exclusive representation, bargaining, union membership, or continued employment. A collective bargaining agreement becomes enforceable because the parties voluntarily accepted it, not because the association possesses statutory power over a nonconsenting counterparty.

A strike, lockout, refusal to bargain, refusal to recognize an association, resignation, or lawful replacement of workers is not independently wrongful merely because it changes bargaining leverage. Wrongfulness arises from an otherwise applicable duty under contract or the General Civic Code, including fraud, violence, threats, property interference, or other nonconsensual harm.

Risk Responsibility

A person or organization voluntarily introducing a material risk through a product, service, facility, activity, or decision bears compensatory responsibility for material harm causally produced by that risk. Foreseeability is not a prerequisite to compensatory redress once the claimant establishes the required causal connection and that the harm falls within the risk created by the activity.

Strict responsibility does not eliminate causation. Independent misuse, an unrelated intervening act, or a harm not materially connected to the activity may defeat or limit the claim. The objective is to keep the cost of created risk with the risk creator rather than transferring unknown losses to innocent victims.

Decision Accountability

Organizations act through people. Material decisions that create or release significant third-party risk are attributable to identifiable Responsible Decision Holders. Organizational form does not erase that attribution.

Decision responsibility may be financed through entity capital, professional liability insurance, decision-holder bonding, excess coverage, reinsurance, or catastrophic pools. Ordinary good-faith error may therefore be financially absorbed without treating the decision-holder as a wrongdoer. Passive investors do not acquire personal decision responsibility merely through ownership.

Culpable Misconduct

Intentional wrongdoing, fraud, concealment, fabrication, knowing violation of duty, recklessness, or similar culpable conduct creates consequences beyond ordinary compensatory responsibility. Those consequences may include uninsured personal liability, RepCap loss, decertification, disqualification from decision authority, punitive remedies, or prosecution where the General Civic Code defines an offense.

Redress follows causation. Accountability follows authority. Punishment follows culpability.

Risk Financing Before Exposure

Activities capable of imposing substantial third-party harm should finance that risk before the public is exposed. Required capacity may scale from ordinary insurance through excess layers, bonds, reserves, reinsurance, or catastrophic pools according to the severity and correlation of possible loss.

A high-harm activity cannot externalize catastrophic loss merely because damages exceed the balance sheet of the entity that created the risk.

The Necessity Case

Anyone may petition the appropriate Civic Council for a new rule. The petition begins at the lowest jurisdiction capable of addressing the alleged problem and must establish a Necessity Case before coercive rule development proceeds.

A Necessity Case identifies the harm, affected parties, evidence, existing general law, voluntary or market mechanisms already available, standards or insurance alternatives, proposed jurisdiction, expected costs, less-coercive alternatives, measurable objectives, and the reason a binding rule is required.

Rule Working Groups

If the Civic Council finds a sufficient Necessity Case, it may issue a narrow writ establishing a temporary Rule Working Group. The writ defines the problem to be studied and grants no enforcement or legislative authority to the group.

Working Groups may include technical experts, materially affected parties, risk specialists, operators, consumer representatives, and other relevant participants. Qualified participants are drawn from transparent registries with conflict screening, relational-independence controls, and rotation where sufficient alternatives exist.

Technical Standards Bodies

Standards bodies may be standing or temporary and may compete. They develop technical thresholds, testing methods, interoperability specifications, accepted practices, and other evidence-based means of satisfying general legal duties.

Compliance with an accredited standard may create a safe harbor or rebuttable presumption of reasonable care. A participant may use another method when it can demonstrate equivalent or superior compliance with the underlying duty.

From Recommendation to Binding Rule

The Rule Working Group or standards bodies develop options. They do not enact the rule. The Civic Council possessing valid jurisdiction decides whether a binding rule is necessary and, if so, which lawful option to adopt within its Mandate Writ.

The authority chain is therefore separated: members and institutions may initiate; Councils authorize development; experts develop; Councils ratify; adjudicators police jurisdiction and rights; operators enforce; auditors review; redress compensates wrongful coercion.

Particularity of Rules

A civic rule extends no broader than the demonstrated problem. A hazard confined to one activity, watershed, class of facility, or jurisdiction does not create general authority over unrelated people or conduct.

Higher-level uniformity requires an actual cross-boundary need rather than administrative convenience or preference for national consistency.

Rule Revalidation

Binding civic rules are subject to scheduled revalidation. The proponent of continuation must show that the underlying problem persists, the rule materially addresses it, actual costs remain proportionate, and less-coercive alternatives have not become sufficient.

A rule that cannot justify continued existence expires. Critical rules may receive a short bridge during an active revalidation proceeding so administrative delay does not create an accidental safety gap, but a bridge cannot become indefinite renewal by default.

AI and Rule Coherence

AI systems may compare proposed rules with the General Civic Code, existing rules, standards, scientific evidence, other jurisdictions, costs, contradictions, and narrower alternatives. They may surface duplication, conflict, or unintended scope.

AI has no rulemaking authority. Its role is to expose information and inconsistency, not to supply legitimacy.

Decision Framework for New Rules

- What specific harm is not adequately addressed by the General Civic Code?
- Can a voluntary standard, insurance requirement, contract mechanism, or adjudicated remedy address it?
- Is the proposed jurisdiction the lowest level capable of solving the problem?
- Who bears the cost and who receives the benefit?
- Does the rule regulate the demonstrated problem or a broader class of unrelated conduct?

- What evidence will determine whether the rule should later be renewed?

Chapter 10 — Public Finance and Fiscal Authority

Purpose

Public finance is itself an exercise of coercive authority. Compactism therefore treats the tax base, fiscal limits, borrowing, and public obligations as constitutional questions rather than as ordinary powers that a government simply possesses.

The Fiscal Base

The fiscal model uses final personal consumption of goods and services as the sole general compulsory tax base. The tax applies when value leaves productive commerce and is acquired for final personal consumption.

Income, wages, payroll, business earnings, saving, investment, unrealized or realized appreciation, ownership of property, wealth, estates, and transfer of existing assets are not taxable merely because value is earned, accumulated, held, inherited, increased, or transferred.

Production, saving, investment, and ownership are not taxable events.
Final personal consumption is.

Goods and Services

Final consumption includes services as well as goods. Personal legal services, financial advice, lodging, entertainment, meals, repairs, lessons, subscriptions, professional services, and other final services are treated consistently with physical goods.

Excluding services would distort consumption toward untaxed categories and recreate a complex classification code.

Productive Inputs

Business inputs remain outside the final-consumption tax so the same economic production is not taxed repeatedly through the supply chain. A contractor buying lumber, an employer buying software, or a manufacturer purchasing components does not pay final-consumption tax on those productive inputs.

A business claiming productive-input treatment uses an auditable commercial identity or account. Personal use disguised as a business input is fraud rather than a reason to create an income-tax return system.

Tax Through the Transaction

No separate consumer declaration is required. Tax is collected through the ordinary transaction that constitutes final consumption.

If a homeowner hires a contractor for a $150,000 addition, the contractor's productive inputs remain untaxed and the final consumer invoice is taxed once. If the homeowner

acts as general contractor, the materials and services purchased directly by the homeowner are taxed as final consumption. There is no separate improvement assessment merely because the house becomes more valuable.

Existing Assets and Resale

Transfer of an existing asset that has already entered final consumption is not itself new consumption. Resale of an existing house, used vehicle, or other previously consumed durable asset is therefore not taxed again merely because ownership changes.

New services created around a resale may still be final consumption. The treatment of dealer margins, mixed assets, new housing, land, rent, and similar edge cases is an implementation question reserved for continued fiscal design rather than constitutional proliferation.

A Broad Base Without Political Exemptions

The preferred model uses a broad consumption base and resists category-specific exemptions that recreate lobbying, classification disputes, and hidden subsidies. If the civic order later chooses to offset the burden on basic consumption, a transparent citizen credit or similar mechanism is preferable to fragmenting the tax base. That distributive choice remains unresolved.

Local, Regional, and National Fiscal Envelopes

Each civic level has a maximum consumption-tax component and corresponding spending capacity. Local fiscal authority originates with local members. Regional fiscal authority is delegated by Local Civic Councils. National fiscal authority is delegated by Regional Civic Councils.

A Council does not seek lower-level approval for every annual budget. It may allocate resources among its authorized functions so long as the budget remains inside the fiscal envelope already delegated to that level.

Foundational Education and Public Finance

The Compact does not constitutionalize one permanent financing model for foundational education. If a Local Civic Unit finances the function, the expenditure must fit inside its existing fiscal envelope or receive the same lower-level authorization required for any enlargement of fiscal authority.

Public financing does not imply public production. Funding may support plural qualified providers and may be designed around the learner or the access obligation rather than a permanent institution. The choice among universal baseline financing, targeted backstop financing, and other models remains an implementation question reserved for continued development.

Increasing Fiscal Authority

A Civic Council cannot enlarge its own fiscal envelope. A Local increase requires the applicable local ratification. A Regional increase requires ratification from Local Civic Councils. A National increase requires ratification from Regional Civic Councils.

Exact thresholds remain an implementation question, but higher-level increases should require both substantial jurisdictional concurrence and substantial population representation so neither raw population nor a collection of very small jurisdictions can dominate alone.

Stability of Delegated Capacity

Previously delegated fiscal capacity should not disappear instantly with a temporary political coalition. Reductions in an existing envelope use a defined process and reasonable transition so enduring obligations can be unwound without destabilizing defense, debt service, or other valid commitments.

Revenue Clearing

A final-consumption transaction may contain Local, Regional, and National components that are calculated and routed automatically by accredited Civic Revenue Clearing Operators. The consumer encounters one transaction rather than three taxing bureaucracies.

Clearing Operators are mechanical financial infrastructure. They do not set rates, determine budgets, create tax categories, or adjudicate liability. Multiple bonded and independently audited operators may provide interoperable clearing services.

No Annual Individual Tax Return

Ordinary individuals do not file annual income or wealth returns because income and ownership are not the tax base. The relevant tax is settled when final consumption occurs.

Businesses claiming productive-input treatment maintain auditable transaction records sufficient to distinguish productive commerce from disguised personal consumption. Administration focuses on transaction classification and fraud rather than reconstructing every individual's annual income.

Destination and Local Allocation

Consumption must be attributed to a civic location so Local and Regional shares do not simply flow to the location of a seller's headquarters. Physical services may follow the place of consumption; delivered goods may follow destination; digital and remote services may follow the consumer's civic residence or another standardized consumption rule.

The allocation protocol should be uniform enough for interoperability while leaving each jurisdiction's authorized rate independent.

Budget Discipline

A Civic Council may spend only on functions within its jurisdiction and only within its fiscal envelope. It cannot create a nominally independent corporation, guarantee, lease, fund, or off-budget vehicle to manufacture additional spending authority.

Ordinary operating budgets should be based on sustainable multi-year revenue rather than peak-cycle receipts. Each level maintains stabilization reserves sufficient to absorb ordinary consumption downturns without immediately increasing tax authority or borrowing.

Mandatory Defense Funding

Regional participation in the common defense is not discretionary. Each Region must fund the personnel, equipment, training, logistics, reserves, and readiness necessary to satisfy its certified Regional Defense Obligation. The required defense allocation is senior to discretionary regional spending.

The obligation is capability-based rather than a blind spending quota. An independently auditable allocation method assigns regional responsibility using objective factors such as population, economic capacity, geography, strategic exposure, and specialized mission assignments. Regions may satisfy different capability mixes while remaining interoperable.

The National Defense Integration Authority may define common readiness and interoperability standards but may not enlarge its own fiscal authority by continuously raising those standards. A material increase in the collective defense requirement beyond existing fiscal envelopes requires the same legitimate civic and bottom-up fiscal authorization required for other expansions of public authority.

Failure to meet a certified defense obligation triggers automatic remediation rather than discretionary national takeover. The Region must restore capability, redirect the required funds ahead of discretionary spending, and replace or restructure a failing defense institution where necessary. The defense obligation survives the failure of any particular provider.

Debt

Borrowing cannot become an indirect power to tax the future. Ordinary debt is prohibited or confined to narrowly defined capital or timing needs whose repayment already fits within the existing fiscal envelope.

Debt service counts fully against future spending capacity. No public obligation becomes invisible because it is labeled off-budget, contingent, guaranteed, pension-related, or assigned to another public entity.

Emergency Debt

Emergency debt may be issued immediately only inside a predefined Immediate Emergency Capacity tied to sustainable revenue. The purpose is to permit action at the speed required by war, catastrophe, or comparable emergency without first conducting a prolonged ratification process.

Borrowing beyond that immediate envelope requires rapid bottom-up ratification. An Absolute Debt Limit remains in force even during emergency and can be exceeded only through an extraordinary Compact-level fiscal process. Extraordinary deficits enter a defined repayment path after the emergency.

Exact percentages, maturities, and ratification periods require fiscal modeling and therefore remain below the Compact. The constitutional requirement is that every stage is capped, visible, and incapable of self-expansion.

Complete Public Financial Visibility

Budgets, debt, guarantees, pension commitments, leases, indemnities, long-term contracts, and contingent liabilities are disclosed as part of the public fiscal position. A citizen can see the revenue authority, current revenue, obligations, debt service, reserves, and remaining fiscal capacity of each civic level.

Decision Framework for Public Finance

- Is the transaction final personal consumption or a productive input?
- Is the civic body spending only on an authorized function within its jurisdiction?
- Does the proposed budget fit inside its existing fiscal envelope?
- If the envelope must increase, has authorization been obtained from below?
- Are debt service and contingent obligations fully counted against fiscal capacity?
- If emergency borrowing is invoked, which predefined cap applies and when does additional authority require ratification?
- Is any implementation detail being elevated into constitutional law merely because it is convenient today?

Chapter 11 — The Enduring Public Core

Purpose

Compactism seeks to minimize dependence on permanent coercive institutions, not to deny functions that require continuity. The Enduring Public Core contains only those functions for which episodic, purely competitive, or entirely voluntary provision cannot reliably maintain the necessary national capacity.

Enduring institutions are permanent implementations only when continuity itself is indispensable. Their authority remains bounded, externally audited, independently adjudicated, and prosecutable.

No Permanent Apex Authority

Compactism does not require a president, prime minister, or equivalent office possessing general executive authority over all public functions. Each enduring function has its own command structure and charter. No office automatically controls the others.

There is a central civic order without a permanent center of governmental power.

Distributed National Defense

National defense is an enduring function established by the Compact, but defensive force is deliberately distributed so that no permanent national institution possesses the overwhelming share of armed capacity. The objective is permanent readiness without permanent concentration of military power.

Distributed force ownership. National integration. Temporary operational command.

Regional Defense Forces

Each Region charters one or more Regional Defense Forces under Compact-wide interoperability, training, readiness, command-authentication, and audit standards. Most conventional personnel and ground-force capacity remain regionally chartered during ordinary conditions.

The Regional Civic Council governs the force's charter, authorized funding, institutional replacement, and compliance obligations but does not tactically command military operations. Professional military command exists inside the chartered force. Regional Defense Forces do not possess ordinary domestic law-enforcement jurisdiction and cannot be directed against civic parties merely by political instruction.

Regional Defense Obligation

Every Region bears a mandatory share of the common defense. The obligation is defined in capabilities rather than a simple percentage-of-spending rule so readiness cannot be

satisfied through wasteful expenditure. It includes certified personnel, equipment, logistics, training, reserves, mobilization readiness, and assigned specialized capabilities.

Regional revenues satisfy the certified defense obligation before discretionary regional spending. If a Region fails readiness certification, a defined remediation process automatically protects the required funding and compels restoration, restructuring, or replacement of the failing defense institution. The Region may replace its provider; it may not decline the obligation.

National Defense Integration Authority

The National Civic Council charters a National Defense Integration Authority responsible for national strategy, doctrine, interoperability, mobilization planning, common training standards, joint exercises and war games, readiness certification, strategic logistics planning, and integration of regional forces. It does not permanently command the bulk of Regional Defense Forces.

The Integration Authority cannot expand the size of the defense obligation merely by redefining readiness. Material increases in required regional capability or national strategic capacity must remain inside existing fiscal authority or proceed through the ordinary authorization and bottom-up fiscal processes.

National Strategic Forces

Capabilities whose function inherently requires national integration may remain nationally chartered. Examples may include national warning and space systems, strategic cyber defense, strategic transport, certain naval or air capabilities, and other systems whose fragmentation would defeat their purpose. Centralization is justified by function rather than convenience.

Catastrophic or strategically irreversible capabilities require heightened independent authorization proportionate to their consequence. No single commander, council officer, or technical operator possesses unilateral authority to employ them.

National Activation and Joint Operational Command

The Compact establishes standing authority for immediate defense against a qualifying foreign armed attack or equivalent unmistakable hostile act. A valid activation automatically makes predetermined regional capabilities available without requiring each Regional Council to renegotiate participation after the attack begins.

Administrative responsibility, personnel systems, and institutional ownership remain regional while authorized operational control transfers temporarily to a Joint Operational Command for the mission. The command receives a defined objective, forces, geographic or functional scope, permitted authorities, review requirements, and termination conditions.

Extended mobilization beyond the Compact-defined immediate defensive period requires a National Defense Writ and the additional civic authorization established for prolonged war. When the activation ends, operational control of Regional Defense Forces reverts automatically. No national commander decides whether to return it.

Permanent readiness. Temporary concentration of command.

Defense Audit and Resistance to Invalid Command

Defense remains subject to independent financial, readiness, command, and Compact-compliance audit. Every activation and major order carries an authenticated authority chain. Regional forces have no duty to execute facially invalid national commands, and national authorities have no power to invent domestic military jurisdiction through emergency language alone.

Distributed force structure is not treated as sufficient protection by itself. Cross-regional training, interoperable command protocols, professional qualification, external audit, succession planning, and separation from ordinary civic enforcement reduce both national takeover risk and the danger of Regional Defense Forces becoming autonomous political armies.

Foreign Affairs

Foreign Affairs is an enduring national function chartered through the National Civic Council. It provides continuity in diplomacy, recognition, negotiation, embassies, international representation, and maintenance of external relationships. Its chief representative speaks for the Compact within a defined mandate but is not head of government.

Foreign Affairs cannot create domestic authority through diplomacy alone. The mechanism for approving treaties or commitments that impose new domestic duties remains an unresolved constitutional design question and belongs in the Evolution chapter until fully developed.

Military Intelligence

Military Intelligence exists inside the defense architecture because military command requires current knowledge of foreign military capabilities, force movements, weapons systems, operational threats, and battlefield conditions. Its authority is limited to military purposes and does not create general domestic surveillance or law-enforcement jurisdiction.

Foreign Intelligence Authority

Foreign clandestine and strategic intelligence is chartered as a separate national function rather than placed wholly inside Defense or Foreign Affairs. Its purpose is to collect and

analyze information concerning foreign governments, organizations, external threats, and other authorized foreign matters for legitimate national consumers.

The Foreign Intelligence Authority does not make foreign policy, command armed forces, adjudicate disputes, or enforce domestic law. Separation prevents the same institution from controlling collection, policy, and coercive response.

Diplomatic Reporting

Foreign Affairs continues to gather information naturally produced through diplomacy, embassies, negotiations, international relationships, and open governmental contact. Diplomatic reporting remains distinct from clandestine intelligence collection and from military intelligence.

Counterintelligence

Counterintelligence is separately chartered to identify and counter foreign espionage, sabotage, penetration, and foreign-directed threats. Its mission does not create an exception to the Compact for domestic investigations.

When counterintelligence seeks information about or coercive action against a person or organization inside the civic order, particularized investigation, independent writs, protected-association rules, evidentiary burdens, audit, Redress Instruments, and every other ordinary Compact safeguard apply.

National Intelligence Assessment Service

A National Intelligence Assessment Service may synthesize authorized reporting from Military Intelligence, Foreign Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, Counterintelligence, Regional sources, and open sources. It collects no intelligence itself and possesses no enforcement, military, diplomatic, or policy authority.

Its purpose is to expose contradictions, evaluate competing assessments, and provide integrated national analysis without allowing the institution controlling collection to control the final interpretation of what the collected information means.

Collection is not assessment. Assessment is not policy. Policy is not military command.

Common Stewardship

Common Stewardship identifies and protects qualifying shared resources or externalized harms that satisfy the Compact's standards for collective intervention. It may maintain scientific, investigative, monitoring, and field capability.

Common Stewardship does not maintain a general police force. It may possess narrow Stop Authority in immediate field situations and may issue defined Provisional Protective

Orders. Continued physical compulsion is executed through Chartered Civic Enforcement unless emergency self-defense independently applies.

Civic Continuity and Emergency Coordination

Cross-functional crises are managed through predesigned Joint Mandates. Foreseeable incident classes establish triggers, participating functions, command relationships, resource limits, information sharing, succession, review, and automatic termination in advance.

A Joint Mandate may create a temporary Incident Director or Unified Command. The office exists only for the incident and possesses only the powers contributed by the participating functions under the Compact.

Permanent capability. Temporary concentration.

Public Finance

Public Finance supplies authorized resources to enduring functions under the fiscal architecture established in Chapter 10. Enduring status does not create an independent taxing power. Each function remains inside the budget and fiscal envelope of the Civic Council that legitimately charters and funds it.

Treasury, settlement, and revenue-clearing mechanisms are implementations rather than sovereign institutions. They may be distributed among accredited operators, but all public obligations remain visible, auditable, and attributable to existing fiscal authority.

Compact Integrity

Compact Integrity is a function, not a supreme branch. It consists of independent mechanisms that test whether institutions remain inside their authority: adjudication, audit, accreditation, claims, Representation Capital, injunction, investigation, and prosecution.

No single Compact Integrity institution owns the final word over all others. The objective is a network of mutually constraining mechanisms operating under common constitutional rules rather than a new apex institution called the guardian of the Compact.

Institutional Renewal

Enduring civic functions are periodically reviewed to determine whether their current institutional implementation remains necessary. A function may remain constitutionally valid while its department is reorganized, divided, competitively replaced, partially automated, or reduced.

An enduring function never becomes a constitutional entitlement for the institution currently performing it.

Chapter 12 — Civic Operations in Practice

Purpose

The preceding chapters establish doctrine and architecture. This chapter tests Compactism against concrete situations in which delay, refusal, violence, institutional overreach, or cross-functional coordination make abstract principles insufficient.

Scenario 1 — The Sequoia

A protected grove contains an irreplaceable resource qualifying for Common Stewardship. A landowner begins cutting despite an existing prohibition or while a credible emergency claim is being evaluated.

1. A Stewardship field officer verifies the location and qualifying condition.

2. If cutting creates imminent irreversible harm, Stewardship issues a narrow Provisional Protective Order and directs the activity to stop.

3. The officer may exercise immediate Stop Authority and secure equipment when reasonably safe, but does not possess general arrest or custodial authority.

4. The order is transmitted immediately to the nearest qualified Civic Enforcement Operator.

5. The operator may restrain, remove, seize specified equipment, or temporarily apprehend a noncompliant person within the writ's scope. Any continued physical detention requires the separate authority applicable to continued detention.

6. Independent adjudication begins automatically and validates, modifies, or dissolves the order within the required period.

7. If the order was invalid or materially excessive, compensation proceeds against the responsible independently controlled Redress Instrument.

8. If the person threatens human life with the chainsaw or another weapon, any defensive use of force is justified by protection of life, not by the value of the tree.

The system acts at the speed of the harm without granting Common Stewardship a vertically integrated police, court, and prison system.

Scenario 2 — Violent Assault

A person attacks another person in public.

1. Any person or protection provider may use proportionate immediate defensive force to stop the assault.

2. A protection service or investigator develops evidence and identifies the alleged offender.

3. The alleged offender is presumed free of wrongdoing and is not compelled to testify, explain the event, authenticate incriminating evidence, disclose memorized credentials, or otherwise construct the case against themselves. Silence is not evidence.

4. If a planned apprehension is necessary, one independent adjudicator may issue a particularized Writ of Apprehension. If immediate danger, flight, or another defined exigency makes delay materially dangerous, an enforcement operator may apprehend first on probable cause and obtain automatic expedited review. The apprehension writ authorizes only short process-securing custody.

5. Continued physical detention beyond the apprehension period requires unanimous concurrence of three independent, non-conflicted adjudicators and a separate showing that detention is necessary rather than a less restrictive condition.

6. The merits are decided by a separately constituted adjudicative panel. The accuser carries the burden of proving guilt to the standard required for the requested remedy; punitive guilt and long-term punitive confinement require the highest standard. Continued or prolonged confinement triggers the higher quorum and periodic review required by the applicable tier.

7. A Civic Enforcement Operator executes the judgment.

8. A Secure Custody Operator holds the offender only if the adjudicated remedy requires confinement.

The offender's consent is unnecessary because Protective Authority arises from the violation of another person's Founding Rights. The burden remains on the system to demonstrate the authority and facts supporting coercion.

Scenario 3 — Contract Default

Two businesses select governing rules, escrow and enforcement terms, but do not preselect a permanent court. One later refuses to perform.

1. The claimant files directly through an adjudication registry. The parties may jointly select a qualified adjudicator; otherwise conflicts are removed, each side receives equal limited strikes, and the required adjudicator or panel is neutrally selected from the remaining pool.

2. The adjudicator or panel resolves the contractual dispute. A material departure from comparable past decisions is identified by the advisory consistency layer and must be explained, but prior decisions do not bind the result.

3. One ordinary appeal is available to a newly constituted, non-conflicted panel. After that appeal, the matter becomes final absent a defined integrity failure.

4. Escrow, collateral, insurance, or bonding executes the remedy automatically where possible. If physical or legal compulsion remains necessary, the final award becomes an enforceable writ and a Civic Enforcement Operator executes only that remaining coercive portion.

The objective is to make physical coercion the final layer rather than the default method of enforcing agreements.

Scenario 4 — Public Department Overreach

A department freezes a company's assets and orders operations suspended. The business claims the department lacks authority and that continued closure will destroy the enterprise before ordinary review could occur.

1. The department's action contains a machine-readable or otherwise explicit authority chain and identifies the emergency basis, if any.

2. The affected party files an immediate authority challenge with an independent adjudication provider.

3. The threshold question is jurisdiction: did the department possess the authority it exercised? The department bears the burden of demonstrating that authority; the business does not have to prove a negative.

4. Because continued closure may create irreversible civic harm, the adjudicator may issue an expedited injunction or require a less destructive interim measure for the affected claimant.

5. The ordinary panel's relief remains particularized to the claimant and matter before it. If the asserted departmental authority itself appears incompatible with the Compact, the panel may refer that question to an independently constituted Compact Review panel for possible system-wide invalidation.

6. If the action lacked authority or materially exceeded it, compensation proceeds against the department's independently controlled Redress Instrument without requiring departmental approval.

7. Serious intentional misconduct triggers external investigation of the officials involved and may result in prosecution, detention, or permanent loss of eligibility for coercive roles.

8. The event becomes part of the institution's auditable performance and Representation Capital history.

The citizen does not begin with the burden of overcoming presumed unlimited governmental authority. The institution must demonstrate the chain authorizing its coercive act.

Scenario 5 — Mass Investigative Overreach

An Investigation Operator holds a valid writ concerning a defined organization or subject. Through an overbroad demand, technical query, or unauthorized expansion, it acquires protected information concerning a very large population of people who were not covered by the writ.

1. The original writ controls. The scale of the returned data does not expand the investigator's authority.

2. Information concerning newly identified subjects is quarantined. It may be used only to determine whether articulable evidence supports a Supplemental Writ.

3. Continued investigation of a newly identified person or organization requires supplemental authority within the predefined interval. A population class, association, or broad political or ideological category cannot substitute for particularized evidence.

4. A newly identified subject is not compelled to explain the discovered material, unlock devices or accounts through memorized credentials, authenticate incriminating evidence through testimonial acts, or otherwise help transform incidental discovery into a case. Investigators must obtain any further evidence through lawful independent means.

5. If the overcollection itself exceeded the writ, the incident automatically triggers external review. Protected associational information or population-scale collection triggers a deep audit regardless of the institution's prior Representation Capital.

6. A common adjudicative finding may establish a Systemic Authority Violation and an affected claimant cohort. Baseline redress is paid from the independent Redress Instrument without requiring each person to relitigate the same threshold violation.

7. Individuals with additional demonstrated harm may pursue supplemental redress.

8. Representation Capital falls according to scope, severity, sensitivity, culpability, concealment, recurrence, and remedial conduct. Crossing the Authority Threshold suspends new investigative authority automatically.

9. Deliberate evasion of writ limits, fabrication, concealment, or systematic prohibited targeting may constitute an Integrity Failure and support immediate decertification and individual prosecution.

The investigative system remains capable of following evidence wherever it legitimately leads while preventing efficiency from becoming a justification for population-scale exploratory surveillance.

Scenario 6 — The Silent Accused

Investigators develop articulable evidence that a person may have committed a serious financial offense. They believe the person's encrypted device, memorized credentials,

personal explanation, and transaction knowledge would make the investigation easier. The person refuses to assist.

1. Refusal is evidentially neutral. It does not establish guilt, create probable cause, or increase the permissible coercion.

2. Investigators carry the burden of obtaining a particularized writ for independently existing evidence they have grounds to seek.

3. A valid writ may authorize seizure of the device or specified property and may compel third-party custodians to produce independently existing records within scope.

4. The subject cannot be compelled to reveal a memorized password, cryptographic key, secret, or credential; create a narrative or reconstruction; explain transactions; authenticate incriminating material through a testimonial act; or otherwise become an investigative instrument against themselves.

5. Investigators may attempt lawful independent access to seized evidence and may continue following evidence that supports supplemental writs.

6. Material exculpatory evidence discovered during the investigation is preserved and disclosed. It cannot be suppressed because it weakens the investigative theory.

7. Evidence obtained outside valid authority cannot bootstrap a new writ. Evidence later discovered through a demonstrably independent lawful source remains usable if that independence can be shown.

8. At adjudication, the external party carries the burden of proving the allegation. The accused is not required to prove innocence, and silence remains neutral.

The system permits vigorous investigation while refusing to conscript the accused into constructing the case against themselves.

Scenario 7 — War

An external military force launches a qualifying attack.

1. The standing defensive activation established by the Compact takes effect immediately. The National Defense Integration Authority does not need to obtain a new general political mandate before defensive action begins.

2. National Strategic Forces act within their standing defensive charter, and predetermined Regional Defense formations are activated according to preplanned mobilization rules.

3. Administrative responsibility for Regional Defense Forces remains regional while operational control transfers temporarily to a Joint Operational Command for the authorized mission.

4. Regional Councils cannot opt out of a valid national defensive activation or withhold the capability they were already obligated to maintain. Prolonged mobilization beyond the immediate defensive period requires the additional National Defense Writ and civic authorization defined by the Compact.

5. Military Intelligence supports military operations. The independent Foreign Intelligence Authority provides authorized foreign intelligence. Foreign Affairs provides diplomatic reporting and conducts diplomacy. A National Intelligence Assessment Service may synthesize those sources without itself commanding forces or making policy.

6. When the incident requires infrastructure coordination, emergency finance, civilian protection, stewardship, or other nonmilitary functions, the appropriate Joint Mandate activates those functions without converting Defense into a general executive authority.

7. Independent audit and Compact review continue to the maximum extent compatible with operational security. Extraordinary authorities remain traceable, time-bounded, and subject to later review.

8. When the activation ends, Joint Operational Command dissolves and operational control of Regional Defense Forces reverts automatically. Permanent capability survives; concentrated command does not.

Scenario 8 — Failure of a Civic Enforcement Operator

A Civic Enforcement Operator develops a record of excessive restraint, unsupported seizures, or falsified execution reports.

1. Claims by people harmed by wrongful action produce compensation from the operator's independently controlled Individual Redress Instrument.

2. If the misconduct materially breaches the operator's charter and creates demonstrable civic costs, the chartering unit may seek reimbursement from Charter Performance Security. Independent adjudication determines breach and loss; the chartering unit cannot adjudicate its own claim or profit from the breach.

3. Defined systemic triggers can require an immediate deep audit before the ordinary annual cycle, and the audit publishes verifiable findings consistent with legitimate privacy and security limits.

4. Representation Capital declines according to scope, severity, culpability, recurrence, concealment, and remedial conduct.

5. Bonding cost and accreditation conditions increase.

6. Crossing the Authority Threshold suspends new coercive authority automatically. An adjudicated Integrity Failure may trigger immediate decertification independently of the numeric score.

7. Other qualified operators absorb the civic function without requiring abolition or reinvention of the underlying authority.

8. The chartering civic unit is separately audited when prior warnings, defective charter terms, renewal decisions, or oversight failures may have contributed to the misconduct. Operator fault does not immunize failed delegation.

9. Officials responsible for intentional misconduct remain subject to individual prosecution.

Failure therefore damages the institution that failed rather than forcing society to choose between tolerating abuse and losing the civic function entirely.

Scenario 9 — A Regional Water Standard

Several Local Civic Units share a watershed. Existing General Civic Code duties and voluntary water-quality standards have produced inconsistent practices, and contamination originating upstream materially affects downstream communities.

1. The affected Local Civic Units document the cross-boundary harm and authorize regional consideration.

2. The Regional Civic Council opens a Necessity Case and issues a narrow writ to a temporary Rule Working Group.

3. Qualified non-conflicted technical participants develop multiple standards and identify costs, uncertainty, and expected outcomes.

4. The Regional Council adopts only the minimum binding rule necessary to address the cross-boundary harm. Technical implementation may remain open to multiple accredited standards.

5. A locality claiming the Regional Council exceeded its jurisdiction may seek independent adjudication. The adjudicator decides jurisdiction, not water policy.

6. The rule enters scheduled revalidation using measured water outcomes and actual compliance costs.

Scenario 10 — Product Harm Without Prior Knowledge

A company releases a product after reasonable testing. Years later, strong evidence establishes that the product caused a serious disease that could not have been identified using available science at the time of release.

1. Claimants still bear the burden of establishing causation and the connection between the disease and the risk created by the product.
2. Once causation is established, compensatory redress does not depend on proving fraud, negligence, or foreseeability.

3. Entity capital, insurance, decision-holder bonding, excess layers, and catastrophic risk facilities satisfy valid claims according to the risk-financing structure.
4. Responsible Decision Holders are not treated as culpable merely because the risk was unknown. Their accountability remains attributable and their performance may affect domain-specific RepCap.
5. If evidence later shows that a decision-holder concealed known risk, culpable-misconduct consequences apply in addition to compensation.

Scenario 11 — National Fiscal Expansion

The National Civic Council concludes that enduring national functions require revenue beyond the currently delegated national consumption-tax envelope.

1. The National Council cannot increase the tax component by its own vote.
2. It publishes the proposed increase, functions to be funded, alternatives considered, projected duration, and complete fiscal position.
3. Regional Civic Councils ratify or reject the requested increase under the applicable jurisdictional and population thresholds.
4. If ratified, the new national component is implemented automatically through revenue-clearing protocols. No national income-tax filing or separate collection bureaucracy is created.
5. If rejected, the National Council must reduce spending, reprioritize authorized functions, use lawful reserves, or pursue another Compact-compliant option.

Scenario 12 — National Defense Overreach

A senior national defense commander attempts to use a security crisis to direct Regional Defense Forces against domestic political opponents without a valid Compact authority chain.

1. The National Defense Integration Authority does not permanently own or command most Regional Defense Forces, so the commander lacks ordinary peacetime control over them.

2. Regional forces verify the activation and order against the authenticated authority chain. A facially invalid domestic political order creates no duty of obedience.

3. Independent Defense Audit and Compact adjudication can immediately test the asserted authority, and any attempt to fabricate or bypass the authority chain constitutes an Integrity Failure.

4. National Strategic Forces remain limited to their chartered missions and heightened authorization requirements; possession of a strategic capability does not create domestic jurisdiction.

5. If the national integration leadership itself is compromised, predetermined succession and replacement mechanisms can instantiate a lawful command structure without transferring general political authority to the military.

6. Regional Defense Forces remain subject to the same rule in reverse: they cannot use regional charter or local political direction to create unauthorized domestic coercive power.

The architecture therefore treats both national military concentration and regional military autonomy as risks to be constrained.

Scenario 13 — National Investigation, Local Apprehension

A nationally chartered Investigation Operator develops credible evidence that a person committed a serious cross-regional financial offense and may flee. The subject currently resides inside a Local Civic Unit far from the investigators.

1. The national investigator presents a particularized application for a Writ of Apprehension. One independent, non-conflicted adjudicator finds probable cause and issues the writ.

2. The national origin of the investigation does not create national arrest jurisdiction. The writ routes to the lowest competent Civic Enforcement Operator where the person is located.

3. The local operator authenticates the writ, verifies identity, scope, redress coverage, and current validity, and apprehends the person. It does not re-investigate the offense or expand the writ.

4. The Writ of Apprehension authorizes only short process-securing custody. If the investigator seeks continued detention, three independently selected adjudicators evaluate the request separately. All three must concur.

5. If one adjudicator denies continued detention, no Writ of Continued Detention issues. The person is released when the apprehension authority expires, subject to separately authorized lesser restrictions such as secured appearance or travel limits.

6. If local execution is genuinely impaired, a regional operator becomes eligible. National direct execution requires a separately reviewable jurisdictional basis; it does not arise merely because the investigation is national.

7. Any continued custody is transferred to an independently chartered Secure Custody Operator. The investigator neither executes the arrest nor controls the place of custody.

The investigation may be national. The writ may be Compact-wide. The physical coercion remains as local as competent execution permits.

Scenario 14 — Charter Breach, Individual Redress, and Civic Loss

A locally chartered Civic Enforcement Operator executes a valid writ against the wrong person after disregarding identity particulars contained in the writ. The wrongful apprehension also forces the Local Civic Unit to suspend the operator, hire emergency replacement capacity, conduct a deep audit, and rebuild execution records.

1. The wrongly apprehended person files directly for redress. An independent adjudicator determines the authority violation and the Individual Redress Instrument pays the valid award without operator or council approval.

2. The Local Civic Unit may immediately suspend or narrow the operator's charter where the governing trigger is satisfied, but that governance action does not determine financial liability.

3. The Local Civic Unit separately files a charter-performance claim. Independent adjudication determines whether the charter was materially breached and which replacement, audit, continuity, and remediation costs were caused by the breach.

4. Charter Performance Security reimburses only demonstrated civic loss. The Local Civic Unit does not receive a windfall or punitive revenue from the operator it governs.

5. If review shows the Local Civic Unit ignored prior warning signs or renewed a defective charter, its own oversight failure is separately recorded and may reduce its recoverable loss or create additional accountability.

6. RepCap, accreditation, decertification, and individual misconduct consequences proceed on their own tracks. Compensation to the victim does not substitute for charter consequences, and charter consequences do not substitute for compensation.

Scenario 15 — Teacher Association and Education Continuity

A Local Civic Unit charters an education provider because voluntary private provision alone is not meeting the foundational education needs of the settlement. Most of the provider's teachers form a voluntary association and demand that the provider recognize it as their exclusive bargaining representative.

1. The teachers are free to organize, select representatives, pool resources, bargain collectively, and withhold their labor according to their individual and contractual rights.

2. The education provider is free to recognize the association and negotiate a collective agreement, negotiate directly with individual teachers, or decline compulsory recognition unless it previously accepted a contractual duty to bargain.

3. The Local Civic Unit does not compel recognition or bargaining merely because the teachers formed an association or obtained majority support. The charter governs the education function; it does not create a special labor-relations power.

4. If the parties voluntarily enter a collective agreement, the agreement is enforceable through ordinary contract and adjudication. Neither the provider nor the association may ignore accepted terms merely because the dispute concerns labor.

5. If a lawful work stoppage threatens continuity of education, the Local Civic Unit protects the function by shifting students or authorized funding to other qualified providers, chartering temporary capacity, or replacing a failing provider. It does not compel teachers to work or compel the provider to accept the association.

6. A labor agreement cannot prevent suspension, replacement, or termination of a provider that no longer satisfies its charter, nor can it convert employees into permanent holders of the civic function.

7. Child safety, fraud, threats, violence, property interference, or other independently wrongful conduct remains subject to the General Civic Code regardless of which side commits it.

The civic order therefore protects voluntary labor organization and continuity of foundational education without granting either the labor association, the provider, or the chartering unit coercive control over the others' ordinary freedom of association.

The Latency Test

Every Compactist safeguard is tested against the speed of the harm it exists to address.

Can legitimate authority act at least as quickly as the harm it exists to prevent?

If the answer is no, the operating mechanism must be redesigned. The solution is not to abandon the constitutional principle but to move preauthorization, review, staffing, communication, and contingency design earlier so that accountability and action can coexist.

Chapter 13 — Intellectual and Institutional Lineage

Purpose

This chapter situates Compactism within prior intellectual and institutional work. It identifies antecedents, practical analogues, and the specific extensions that distinguish the Compactist synthesis. These references are precedents and points of comparison, not authorities or independent validation of the architecture.

Compactism does not claim that decentralization, subsidiarity, functional jurisdictions, arbitration, standards governance, or distributed military structures are new ideas. Its architecture is deliberately informed by prior institutional experience. Those precedents matter for two reasons: they show that important components have been implemented or seriously studied, and they make it possible to identify more precisely what Compactism changes rather than treating novelty as an end in itself.

Polycentric Governance — Vincent and Elinor Ostrom

Polycentric governance provides the broadest intellectual antecedent. Vincent Ostrom and later Elinor Ostrom examined orders in which multiple decision centers operate with meaningful independence while interacting under shared rules. Elinor Ostrom's work emphasized institutional diversity, multiple scales, and the possibility that complex public goods and common-pool resources can be governed through arrangements that are neither purely market nor purely hierarchical state administration. [1][2]

Compactism adopts the polycentric premise but makes the decomposition of authority itself explicit. It asks not only how many decision centers exist, but which kinds of authority each center may possess and which powers must remain institutionally separate.

Functional, Overlapping, and Competing Jurisdictions — FOCJ

Bruno Frey and Reiner Eichenberger's Functional, Overlapping, and Competing Jurisdictions are a particularly close conceptual antecedent. FOCJ are governmental jurisdictions organized around functions rather than one territorial government performing every task; they may overlap geographically, compete, exercise enforcement power, and raise taxes. [14]

Compactism shares the functional intuition but does not make jurisdictional competition its central organizing principle. It adds bottom-up Mandate Writs, a small General Civic Code, incomplete coercive chains, distributed adjudication, independently controlled redress, Representation Capital, and explicit separation of military, intelligence, fiscal, and emergency authority.

Swiss Federalism and Subsidiarity

The Swiss constitutional order provides practical precedent for subsidiarity, substantial cantonal and communal autonomy, and national responsibility for functions such as

defense and foreign affairs. The Swiss Constitution expressly requires subsidiarity in the allocation and performance of state tasks and reserves undelegated authority to the cantons. [12]

Compactism extends the local-first principle beyond federal allocation. Local, regional, and national authority are treated as distinct scopes rather than a simple hierarchy of superior and subordinate governments, and higher jurisdiction remains independently contestable.

Conferral, Subsidiarity, and Proportionality in European Union Law

Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union combines three ideas closely related to Compactist jurisdiction: conferral limits the Union to competences granted by the Member States; subsidiarity asks whether objectives can be sufficiently achieved at lower levels; and proportionality limits action to what is necessary. [15]

Compactism generalizes those ideas downward to the individual and Local Civic Unit, applies them to coercive and fiscal authority as well as legislative competence, and subjects contested jurisdiction to the same independent adjudicative architecture used elsewhere in the civic order.

Technical Standards Governance — IETF and ISO

The IETF demonstrates that technically consequential rules can be developed through open processes, technical competence, working groups, and rough consensus rather than ordinary legislative voting. ISO provides a complementary distinction: its standards are voluntary unless a competent legal authority chooses to incorporate or reference them. [16][17]

Compactism uses that separation deliberately. Standards bodies may develop safe harbors, interoperability requirements, testing methods, and technically credible solutions, but technical expertise does not itself create coercive authority. General Civic Law and properly authorized Civic Rules remain the source of binding duties.

Plural Adjudication and Enforceability

Private arbitration demonstrates that adjudication and public employment need not be identical. The New York Convention supplies a durable international framework for recognition and enforcement of qualifying arbitral awards across jurisdictions. [3]

Compactism extends plural adjudication into the civic domain while adding certification, bonding, Representation Capital, relational conflict screening, escalating concurrence for severe coercion, one-level appeal, and exceptional Compact Review.

Emergency Coordination and Distributed Command

Existing institutions also provide partial analogues for acting quickly without permanently centralizing every function. Temporary restraining orders illustrate provisional intervention

before full review when irreparable harm is imminent. Incident Command demonstrates modular and unified coordination among multiple organizations. National Guard command statuses and Swiss defense structures show that force ownership, administrative control, and national integration need not be identical. [4][5][11][12]

Compactism synthesizes these lessons into the rule that urgency may change the sequence of accountability but not eliminate accountability, and into a defense model of distributed force capacity with temporary national operational command.

Particularity, Association, and Evidentiary Restraint

Existing constitutional doctrines provide narrower precedents for several Compactist protections: warrant particularity, associational privacy, the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, and duties concerning material exculpatory evidence. [7][8][9][10] Compactism treats these not as isolated procedural exceptions but as parts of a general theory in which the party seeking coercion bears the burden and investigative authority does not silently expand itself.

Precedent Matrix

Precedent	**Demonstrated idea**	**Compactist extension**
Polycentric governance	Multiple decision centers operating at different scales and through diverse institutional forms.	Makes the decomposition of geographic, functional, coercive, fiscal, military, informational, and adjudicative authority explicit.
FOCJ	Functional, overlapping, competing governmental jurisdictions with enforcement and fiscal capacity.	Adds bounded upward delegation, Mandate Writs, incomplete coercive chains, independent redress, and a non-monopoly adjudicative layer.
Swiss federalism / subsidiarity	Substantial lower-level autonomy; state tasks allocated according to subsidiarity; national defense and foreign affairs remain national functions.	Treats jurisdiction as independently contestable and extends local-first allocation across more kinds of authority.
EU conferral / subsidiarity / proportionality	Higher authority acts only within conferred competence, when lower levels are insufficient, and only as far as necessary.	Extends the test to individual delegation, public finance, coercive scope, and institutional charters.

Precedent	Demonstrated idea	Compactist extension
IETF / ISO	Distributed technical rule development; voluntary standards distinct from binding law.	Uses standards as advisory/safe-harbor infrastructure while keeping coercive adoption in bounded representative authority.
Private arbitration / New York Convention	Plural adjudication with common recognition and enforcement mechanisms.	Adds public/coercive adjudication tiers, relational independence, RepCap, bonding, and escalating concurrence.
Incident Command / dual-status military structures	Temporary unified coordination across otherwise separate organizations and command statuses.	Generalizes temporary concentration through Joint Mandates and distributes most conventional force capacity regionally.
Bonding, insurance, audit, constitutional procedure	Existing mechanisms can price risk, externalize review, and compensate defined losses.	Makes preexisting redress, auditability, and earned institutional trust conditions of delegated coercive authority.

The Synthesis Claim

The relevant originality claim is therefore architectural rather than component-level. Compactism combines precedents that are usually discussed separately and asks them to operate under one constitutional logic: authority must be sourced, bounded, particularized where possible, incomplete within any one institution, reviewable by actors outside the authority being exercised, financially accountable when it causes wrongful loss, and terminable when its delegated purpose ends.

Polycentric governance distributes decision centers. FOCJ distributes functional jurisdictions. Federalism and subsidiarity distribute territorial competence. Standards organizations distribute technical rule development. Arbitration distributes adjudication. Insurance and bonding distribute financial risk. Compactism combines these ideas and extends them by deliberately decomposing the underlying authority chains that conventional institutions tend to accumulate.

The claim is not that Compactism has no ancestors. The claim is that the synthesis produces a civic architecture with a different unit of design: not the branch, agency, office, or level of government, but authority itself.

Chapter 14 — The Living Compact: Evolution of Compactism

Purpose

The Compact establishes the enduring identity of Compactism. The Evolution chapter is a living notebook for known risks, unresolved questions, and mechanisms that may extend the civic order but are not yet sufficiently developed to become constitutional requirements.

Ideas remain here until their incentives, failure modes, implementation requirements, and consistency with the Compact are understood.

Known Risks and Unresolved Problems

- Accreditation capture. Accreditors and auditors can themselves become cartels, ideological gatekeepers, or indirect monopolies.
- Fragmentation. Too many providers may create inconsistent standards, forum shopping, interoperability failures, and public confusion.
- Inequality of access. Wealthier parties may purchase better representation, investigation, or expert support even when adjudication is formally equal.
- Representation Capital misuse. A trust mechanism can become a de facto social-credit system if it is centralized, universalized, or allowed to affect Founding Rights.
- Redress insolvency and concentration. A systemic failure may produce claims larger than a single operator's reserve or insurer can satisfy, requiring carefully designed reserve, reinsurance, and catastrophic-loss architecture without creating a new unaccountable monopoly.
- Investigative fragmentation. Particularized warrants, short supplemental-writ clocks, multiple data custodians, and independent review can create latency or inconsistency unless protocols are standardized and emergency preservation rules are clear.
- Evidence-access constraints. Strong protection against compelled testimonial assistance may make encrypted or personally controlled evidence difficult to obtain. The system must preserve meaningful investigative capability through particularized search, seizure, third-party evidence, expert analysis, and independent-source rules without turning the subject into an involuntary investigative tool.
- Adjudicator scarcity. Highly specialized fields or small jurisdictions may not contain enough qualified people to satisfy aggressive cooling periods and relational-independence requirements without unacceptable delay.
- Registry and selection capture. Candidate pools, conflict classifications, randomization, and discretionary strikes can become indirect sources of outcome control unless registries and selection methods are independently auditable.
- Consistency-system capture. An AI consistency layer can become a hidden source of precedent if its retrieval, similarity judgments, training, or governance are opaque or

monopolized. Transparency, contestability, and plural certified engines are therefore essential.

- Emergency normalization. Provisional powers may become routine unless expiration, review, and liability are genuinely automatic.
- Public finance. Any compulsory funding mechanism can recreate broad coercive leverage and requires its own constitutional design.
- Distributed defense. Regionalization reduces national takeover risk but creates its own dangers: inconsistent readiness, regional political capture, interoperability failure, delayed mobilization, and competition between regional and national command. The architecture therefore depends on mandatory capability obligations, common standards, authenticated activation, joint training, and automatic reversion of temporary national command.
- Intelligence fragmentation. Separating collection, assessment, diplomacy, counterintelligence, and military intelligence reduces concentration but can create gaps, duplication, compartmentation, and slow information sharing unless interfaces and lawful sharing protocols are designed well.
- Foreign commitments. A system without a legislature needs a credible mechanism for binding national commitments without creating indirect domestic rulemaking.
- Criminal standards. Plural adjudication must preserve consistent minimum protections and avoid inconsistent treatment of similarly situated people.
- Transition. Moving from an existing sovereign state into a decomposed civic architecture would be more difficult than designing the architecture from first principles.
- Constitutional legitimacy across generations. Compactism rejects fictional unlimited consent by birth but still must explain the legitimate status of the Compact for people born into the civic order.
- Private coercion risk. A privately owned operator with public authority can be as dangerous as a public monopoly unless its incentives, authority, redress capacity, and oversight are genuinely constrained.
- Indirect representation can create distance between members and national delegates; Mandate Writs and public attribution must remain meaningful rather than ceremonial.
- Short political terms can transfer practical power to permanent staff, technical experts, or registry operators unless persistent knowledge is rigorously separated from decision authority.
- A General Civic Code that is too vague transfers lawmaking into adjudication; a code that is too detailed recreates the accumulation Compactism seeks to avoid.
- Standards bodies can be captured by industries, professions, or ideological communities even without formal governmental control. Competing standards,

conflict graphs, transparent evidence, and rotation reduce but do not eliminate that risk.

- Education capture. Public financing, provider accreditation, curriculum standards, or local chartering can become mechanisms for ideological control, incumbent-provider protection, or labor capture. Plural provision, capability-based outcomes, transparent standards, and replaceable providers reduce but do not eliminate that risk.
- Strict risk responsibility can over-deter beneficial activity if causation, risk scope, insurance markets, and catastrophic-loss financing are poorly designed.
- A final-consumption tax simplifies individual taxation but still requires robust treatment of business inputs, mixed use, housing, secondhand assets, financial services, destination, fraud, and cyclical revenue.
- Bottom-up fiscal authorization can constrain overreach but may underfund genuine national needs if ratification thresholds are poorly calibrated.
- Emergency borrowing remains vulnerable to normalization unless immediate, extended, and absolute debt limits are mechanically enforced and extraordinary deficits are repaid.

CLOSING REFLECTIONS

The Compact begins with a civic problem rather than a political campaign: people need enough common authority to protect rights, preserve qualifying shared interests, respond to emergencies, sustain exchange, and defend themselves, while the same authority can become the mechanism through which institutions injure the people they were created to protect.

Compactism responds by refusing to treat force, law, adjudication, finance, representation, or public administration as indivisible governmental possessions. Authority is traced to its source, instantiated for a purpose, divided by function, localized where practical, independently reviewed, and paired with redress.

The Compact Experience gives those ideas somewhere to live. Telo creates and operates autonomous organizations and members. Locus provides the Economy of Trust in which they own, transact, contract, finance risk, and build earned trust. Envoy gives a human persistent Trusted Representation without transferring unlimited authority. The Compact remains the civic order governing the resulting relationships when consent and markets alone are insufficient.

The experience does not need mass adoption to become meaningful. It is designed to remain alive with a single human participant because autonomous members can sustain commerce, institutions, civic events, and history continuously. Other humans can join later; they enrich the culture rather than make the implementation possible.

This also creates a practical path from conceptual synthesis to implementation. A Locus transaction engine, Envoy delegation model, Telo company runtime, adjudication registry, authority-writ protocol, Representation Capital system, or redress mechanism can become mature software inside The Compact Experience before any real customer or jurisdiction is asked to adopt it.

As the experience expands, it can encounter rival human orders, frontier and pirate-adjacent societies, and eventually nonhuman civilizations. Those encounters create new questions of law, trust, representation, trade, diplomacy, defense, and civic standing without changing the basic design discipline: authority must still be justified rather than presumed.

Authority is never presumed. It has a source, a scope, a purpose, and an end.

The objective of the experience is not to prove that Compactism should govern the physical world. It is to make the civic order operational enough to be inhabited, challenged, observed, and improved through use while remaining worthwhile as a persistent world in its own right.

Working Draft Version 0.12 makes the separation explicit. The Compact is the civic order. Compactism is its civic doctrine. The Compact Experience is the intended gamified realization. Telo, Locus, and Envoy help make that realization live. None of those implementation choices is required for The Compact itself to stand.

REFERENCE ANALOGUES

The following references are not authorities for Compactism. They are intellectual and institutional precedents used to situate the architecture, acknowledge related work, and demonstrate that many individual components have historical, legal, or institutional analogues even though the integrated Compactist synthesis remains untested.

[1] Vincent Ostrom, "Polycentricity" (1972). Indiana University Digital Library of the Commons.
https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/items/daa422ea-b684-4220-b57c-aaf6653653af

[2] Elinor Ostrom, "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems" (Nobel Prize Lecture, 2009).
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2009/ostrom/lecture/

[3] United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention, 1958).
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/foreign_arbitral_awards

[4] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, Injunctions and Restraining Orders.
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